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Abstract 
My dissertation broadly relates to the low uptake of preventive health services in 
developing countries despite the services’ low cost and potential to avert subsequent catastrophic 
expenses. Using Nepal as a setting, in the first two chapters, I answer two key questions on 
preventive health that are of general interest to health researchers and policymakers.  
Question 1. Can we improve the uptake of health services by the traditionally 
marginalized groups through the use of differential financial incentives to outreach workers?  
For the last three decades or so, the research community has cataloged the differences in 
health outcomes and access between different groups—based on race, ethnicity, gender and other 
characteristics—and on a range of medical conditions. And much of the research by economists 
has focused on improving service utilization in general. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I 
focus on the differential access between individuals from different ethnic groups, and propose 
and test the use of differential financial incentives as a way to address it. The differential 
incentives that I propose are ones that depend on the characteristics of the individual to whom 
the outreach workers reach.  
I answer the question using a field experiment in Nepal. The medical condition of interest 
in the study is diabetes, the prevalence of which is nine percent in the country in 2016 (World 
Health Organization, 2016). Anecdotal evidence shows that individuals do not go for the 
diagnosis and treatment of diabetes until the conditions become severe. The resulting health 
costs, disability and sometimes death affect not only the patients but also their families and 
communities.  Like in many other countries, health outreach workers, called the Female 
Community Health Volunteers, are used to encourage the use of health services in Nepal. In 
general, the health outreach workers target a certain geographic area, provide information about 
available health services, and encourage individuals to utilize those services. Literature in 
sociology suggests that interactions, such as those that the outreach workers engage in, are more 
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difficult when they involve individuals from different identities such as ethnicity. If the 
advantaged ethnic groups reach out primarily to their own groups, inequality could be worsened 
by the existing outreach efforts; more individuals from the advantaged groups would access 
services with only a small increase, if any, in the number of individuals from disadvantaged 
groups.  
In the experiment, I varied the amount of financial incentives provided to the health 
outreach workers by the ethnicity of the client they recruited for a free sugar-level assessment. I 
also varied the amount of incentives the clients received for appearing for the assessment. With 
this set up, I measure the extent of barriers to outreach effort and to healthcare utilization that 
individuals face because of their ethnicity and investigate the role of differential and non-
differential incentives in offsetting those barriers. I also examine the asymmetric nature of the 
barriers that health outreach workers and individuals from traditionally disadvantaged and 
advantaged ethnic groups face. I find that the barriers due to ethnicity are high. Even a highly 
skewed differential incentive (in the ratio of 5:2) favoring cross-ethnic interactions is insufficient 
to offset the barriers.  Encouragingly, differential incentives to the advantaged workers, geared 
toward encouraging them to refer disadvantaged individuals, have the potential to improve 
access for the disadvantaged groups.  
In addition to answering important research questions, the findings from the experiment 
have immediate policy implications for how financial incentives should be structured to 
encourage the diagnosis of non-communicable medical conditions, both in Nepal and other 
countries. The health outreach workers in Nepal have been praised in the international health 
community for their contribution in reducing maternal and child mortality in the country. This 
study generates insights on the extent to which the experience of these workers can be extended 
to other conditions such as diabetes, obesity and mental health that were traditionally not known 
to be common in the country (likely due to under-diagnosis). My results imply that the health 
outreach workers can continue to play an important role in encouraging preventive health 
behavior. The policy challenge now is to build an incentive structure so that the significant 
disparities prevalent in the uptake of common, communicable diseases and their outcomes do not 
extend to the newer, non-communicable conditions, such as diabetes.  
Question 2. What are the long-term consequences of preventive health measures 
undertaken in childhood?  
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There is now a critical threshold of evidence documenting the relationship between one’s 
exposure to shocks in early life and outcomes in adulthood. In a seminal review article in the 
Annual Review of Economics, Janet M. Currie and Tom S. Vogl summarize the work done so far 
on the relationship between early-life nutrition, famine, rainfall, pollution, disease and war, and 
long-term health outcomes, primarily height. Based on their extensive review, they argue that 
“[F]uture research should focus on identifying pathways and mechanisms; measuring the relative 
magnitudes of the effects of different health shocks; examining interactions between shocks; and 
revisiting the question of critical periods” (p. 29).  My second chapter contributes to the existing 
literature responding to that call. The first goal of the chapter is to examine the effect of an early-
life nutritional intervention on health outcomes that the intervention is intended to affect directly 
as evidenced by the medical literature, thereby elucidating on a clear mechanism. A second goal 
is to assess the effect of age at first exposure to the intervention, again on expected health 
outcomes, to get at the role of critical periods.  In many countries with a history of discrimination 
and unequal access to resources based on gender and ethnicity, it is natural to expect different 
effects of the program on these dimensions. Therefore, the final goal is to evaluate heterogeneous 
effects of the program by gender and by ethnicity. In addition to the effect on health outcomes, I 
also evaluate the effect on education outcomes to check whether the findings here are consistent 
with the vast amount of literature showing that healthier children tend to be healthier adults with 
better educational and labor market outcomes.    
I make use of Nepal’s vitamin A supplementation program, the primary goal of which 
was to reduce mortality associated with the nutrient’s deficiency. Vitamin A deficiency affects 
nearly 21 percent children below the age of five years in developing countries and leads to the 
deaths of over 800,000 women and children each year (West, 2002). The sequential rollout of 
Nepal’s vitamin A supplementation program between 1993 and 2001 and the age eligibility 
provide an exogenous variation in exposure to the program. I utilize that variation to estimate the 
causal effect of the program on long-term health and economic outcomes. While such programs 
have had significant positive short-term benefits in reducing mortality in Nepal and elsewhere, as 
documented in the medical literature, the study aims to provide additional insights on potential 
mechanisms through which early-life interventions affect long-term outcomes. I find that the 
program reduced the probability of having a disability or blindness, kept children in school 
longer, and enabled them to complete different grades by an expected age. The positive effects 
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on disability and education seem to have improved marriage prospects. The program also had 
different effects on individuals based on their timing of the exposure to the program, with a 
longer exposure usually strengthening the positive effects. As expected, effects also differed by 
the individual’s gender and ethnicity. They were more pronounced for men and individuals from 
traditionally advantaged ethnic groups.  
Question 3. What is the causal effect of Nepal’s Community-Based Neonatal Care 
Package intervention? 
In the third chapter, I evaluate an existing program broadly aimed at reducing child 
mortality and improving women’s health behavior using a rigorous econometric technique. The 
goal of this chapter is to contribute to ongoing efforts on evidence-based policymaking in Nepal. 
I evaluate the impact of Community-Based Neonatal Care Package, which the government 
piloted in 2009 in 10 of the 75 districts. The causal effect of the program is established using a 
before-and-after comparison of outcomes in program districts relative to those in non-program 
districts. I find that the program was successful in encouraging cleaner deliveries for births that 
took place at home and in increasing prenatal visits to the health center by pregnant women 
significantly. Despite these positive effects on intermediate outcomes, the program’s overall 
effect on neonatal mortality was limited. There is also no evidence that the program increased 
institutional or professional-attended deliveries. The lack of an effect on other supply-dependent 
indicators suggests that supply-side constraints may have dampened the program’s overall effect. 
While this program has been evaluated before, I put it to a more rigorous test, and show that the 
effects may be less impressive than what previous analyses—many of them qualitative or based 
on a simple pre-program versus post-program comparisons within the program districts—have 
shown. More importantly, consistent with the international shift in efforts toward improving the 
quality of health services—from current efforts focused on access—my findings call for 
improvements in the supply-side if the health of Nepalese women and children is to improve 
more rapidly.   
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1. Barriers to Inter-Ethnic Interactions in Healthcare: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The uptake of healthcare services in developing countries is low, even for simple cost-
effective technologies (Kremer and Glennerster, 2011). Supply side efforts to raise uptake 
include reducing distance to services (Thornton, 2008), improving the quality of services (Clasen 
et al., 2007), and improving the reliability of supply (Banerjee et al., 2010), among others. On 
the demand side, the dominant interventions include providing information, financial rewards, or 
both, for seeking care (Jacobs et al., 2011; Dupas, 2011).  
 This study focuses on the issue of differential access and uptake of healthcare services 
among individuals from different groups, although its findings also help understand barriers to 
uptake in general (as the average uptake is usually reduced by the low uptake of the minority 
groups). Unequal access and uptake of healthcare services is a major problem in both developed 
and developing countries (Braveman and Tarimo, 2002). Minority groups tend to have a lower 
access to and uptake of healthcare services than majority groups (O’Hara and Caswell, 2010). 
Outreach workers are often used to solve the problem of low access for minority groups. The 
expectation from policymakers is that outreach workers would reach individuals from minority 
groups who would not otherwise access services. However, the majority groups are 
overrepresented in the health workforce (Snyder et al., 2015; AHRQ 2013). Literature in 
sociology suggests that individuals find it easier to reach out to others like themselves (Barnes-
Mauthe et al., 2013). If the majority groups reach out primarily to their own groups, inequality 
could be worsened by the existing outreach efforts; more individuals from majority groups 
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would access services with only a small increase, if any, in the number of individuals from 
minority groups.  
Several studies have evaluated the effect of ethnic matching on treatment outcomes, 
particularly in mental health (e.g., Cabral and Smith, 2011). However, such matching is not 
always possible, especially in a resource-poor setting. Matching becomes particularly difficult 
for preventive health because the risk profile of an individual is not known beforehand—often, 
one does not know who to encourage diagnosis, let alone how best to encourage and incentivize 
such a behavior. In general, political and cultural issues can undermine efforts aimed at making 
the composition of outreach workers reflective of the target population (Rao and Flores, 2007).  
Therefore, in order to improve access for minority groups and thus address inequality in 
general, it is important to find a mechanism to encourage outreach workers from one group to 
reach out to those from another.  Financial incentives have proven to be effective in nudging 
individuals toward a socially preferred behavior in many settings (Giles et al., 2014), but the 
extent of the effect on outreach effort vis-à-vis multiethnic interactions is poorly understood. We 
are unaware of any study that attempts to offset inter-ethnic barriers among health workers with 
differential financial incentives.  
Against this background, this study is designed to answer four key questions. First, what 
is the extent of the barrier to encouraging and seeking preventive health care (in this case, 
diagnosis of diabetes) that is caused by the difference in the ethnicity of the individual and that 
of health outreach workers? Second, can we incentivize health outreach workers from one ethnic 
group to recruit individuals from another group for the diagnosis, either through higher, non-
differential incentives or through differential incentives favoring recruitment from a different 
ethnicity? Third, does the extent of barriers to outreach effort differ by the outreach worker’s 
ethnicity? In other words, is the extent of the barriers faced by a health worker from a 
traditionally advantaged ethnic group different from the one faced by a worker from a 
disadvantaged group? Finally, on the demand side, does the clients’ decision to use healthcare 
services depend on the ethnicity of the outreach worker and if so, can financial incentives to the 
clients help increase the chances that a client utilizes the services? 
In economics, the paper is related the most closely to the literature on discrimination, 
which is also a form of barrier. Economists continue to debate the dominant form, the 
measurement and the mitigation of discrimination since the seminal works of Becker (1957) and 
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Arrow (1973). The two strands that have progressed over the years—one on taste-based 
discrimination and another on statistical—both recognize that individuals may be willing to pay 
a positive amount in order to interact with individuals from their own ethnic groups or race. In 
our study, when looking at the barriers that advantaged health workers face when reaching out to 
disadvantaged clients, the dominant barrier is discrimination, although we are unable to rule out 
other factors conclusively. Nonetheless, we are able to estimate how much individuals are 
willing to forego in order to interact with individuals like themselves (i.e., from their own ethnic 
category) and extend the literature in three other ways. First, while prior studies have looked at 
discrimination—a form of barrier—from the dominant group to a dominated group, our setup 
allows us to compare the extent of barriers a traditionally advantaged outreach worker faces 
when reaching out to a disadvantaged individual and that of barriers a disadvantaged outreach 
worker faces when reaching out to an advantaged individual. In the US, this would be analogous 
to asking: how is the extent of the barrier that a White physician faces when interacting with an 
minority patient different from the extent of the barrier that a minority physician faces when 
interacting with a White patient? Second, we are also able to measure the barrier at multiple 
stages of the healthcare seeking process. Finally, as discussed below, we evaluate the barriers 
from the perspective of the service providers as well as the seekers.  
 We recruited all health volunteers within a geographic territory in a semi-urban district in 
Nepal, randomized them into four arms, provided them a basic training on diabetes and asked 
them to recruit clients from the community for a free sugar-level assessment at their local health 
center. We varied the amount of financial incentives they received.  In two of the arms, the 
amount depended on the ethnicity of client the health volunteers recruited. In one of these two 
arms, we provided a higher amount for recruiting a client from their own ethnicity (which we 
call an own-type referral) than for recruiting a client from a different ethnicity (an other-type 
referral), whereas in the other, we provided a higher amount for recruiting a client from a 
different ethnicity. That variation allows us to compare how much additional effort health 
volunteers make when they are incentivized to recruit own-type clients and when they are 
incentivized to recruit other-type clients. The comparison of the number of own-type and other-
type referrals in the first arm, in which the amount of incentive does not depend on the type of 
the referral, allows us estimate the extent of the barrier at baseline. Likewise, comparison 
between the first and the fourth arm, in which the amount of incentive is higher, allows us to 
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answer additional research questions on the role of non-differential incentives in presence of 
ethnic heterogeneity.  
We included a second level of randomization to evaluate barriers due to ethnicity from 
the clients’ perspective. For an individual to increase his or her uptake of health services based 
on a health worker’s persuasion, the individual should be receptive to the health worker’s 
message. It is possible for the individual not to act on the health worker’s suggestion, even if the 
health worker does not face any barrier to reaching out to that individual. The same level of 
effort on the part of the health worker can then lead to different outcomes (in terms of whether 
the individual increases his/her uptake of health services) based on whether the health worker 
and the individual are from the same ethnicity. By randomizing incentives received by clients for 
showing up for a checkup, we are able to assess if incentives can help offset the barriers faced by 
a prospective patient when his/her ethnicity does not match with that of the health volunteer.   
To preview the results, we find that the barriers due to ethnicity are high. At baseline, the 
health volunteers recruited only three other-type clients for every five own-type clients. Even a 
highly differential incentive in the ratio of 5:2, geared toward encouraging the health volunteers 
to recruit clients from an ethnic group different than their own, is insufficient to offset the 
barriers. In sub-group analysis, we find suggestive evidence that differential incentives to the 
traditionally advantaged health volunteers have the potential to improve access for the 
disadvantaged groups. We also find that the advantaged and disadvantaged health volunteers 
face different amounts of barriers to outreach efforts, with the latter facing a “stereotype threat”. 
Financial incentives to the clients had no effect on their decision to appear for the assessment. 
 
1.2 The Study Setting 
The subjects in this study are the Female Community Health Volunteers (health 
volunteers) in a semi-urban area in western Nepal and the clients they recruited for a free sugar-
level assessment. Nepal is an appropriate site for this study because of the persistent prevalence 
of health disparities between ethnic groups and the low uptake of preventive health services. 
Significant disparities exist in both access to healthcare services and health outcomes between 
ethnic groups (Pandey et al., 2013). In fact, widespread discrimination and inequality, in all 
spheres of life, catalyzed the Maoist insurgency, which claimed 15,000 lives between 1996 and 
2006 (Nepal, Bohra and Gawande, 2011). Following a protracted peace process, in September 
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2015, the country adopted a new constitution, which has renewed the commitment to addressing 
inequality.  
The prevalence of diabetes, the medical condition of interest in this study, is rapidly 
rising in Nepal, with current prevalence at 9.1% (World Health Organization, 2016). In general, 
the burden of disease is shifting quickly from communicable to non-communicable conditions 
such as cardiovascular diseases, cancer, chronic respiratory diseases and mental order (Ministry 
of Health and Population, 2015).  
The government created the health volunteers in 1989 to help administer vitamin A 
supplements to children. There are nearly 48,000 health volunteers, all female, in the country 
(Andersen et al., 2013). Each health volunteer is responsible for her Ward, which is the lowest 
administrative unit in the country. The health volunteers are primarily tasked to create awareness 
about available health services and to encourage individuals in their Ward to utilize those 
services. Over the years, the health volunteers’ role has expanded significantly and they have 
been praised in the international development community for their success in reducing child and 
maternal mortality (Center for Global Development, 2011). Based on the country’s past 
experience in reducing child and maternal mortality, the health volunteers can potentially play an 
integral role in the management of the new conditions as well. The extent to which this can 
happen, however, has not been evaluated. Apart from answering the research questions listed 
earlier, this paper also helps fill that gap. 
The Nepalese government has categorized the country’s more than 100 ethnicities into 6 
main categories based on religion, caste and ethnicity, and further into advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups based on historical access to resources. In this study, we use these two 
broad categories. The differences—both in access and outcomes—are pronounced between these 
categories (Pandey et al., 2013). The categorization also has a political appeal. Other studies 
have also used this categorization as a basis for ethnicity (e.g., Mishra, Joshi and Khanal, 2014). 
The advantaged or disadvantaged status of an individual is known to the health volunteers. The 
general public can also infer it from the individual’s last name.  
 
1.3 The Study Design 
We randomly assigned 72 health volunteers into four arms stratified by their ethnic 
category (advantaged versus disadvantaged), education, and age. We invited the health 
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volunteers for one-day training on diabetes at their local health center. After the training, two 
days before the checkup, the research team visited the health volunteers at their home and 
explained to them the incentive structure in private. We explained the incentive structure in 
private so that one health volunteer’s behavior was not influenced by the knowledge of what 
other volunteers were receiving. We did not reveal the specific objectives of the study and the 
incentive structure even to the research staff. Additional details on the implementation are in 
Appendix 1.A.  
Each health volunteer was told that she would receive an amount of money based on the 
number of clients who came for the checkup at their local health center on the pre-specified date 
and time, and according to the schedule in Table 1.1.  To summarize, in arms 1 and 4, the 
amount of incentive per referral did not depend on the ethnicity of the client the health volunteers 
recruited. In arm 1, which we refer to as the Low arm in the rest of the paper, the health 
volunteers received Nepalese rupees (Rs) 20 per referral. The exchange rate between the US 
dollar and the Nepalese rupee was $1: Rs100 at the time of the experiment. Therefore, Rs 20 is 
approximately $0.2 (or 20 cents). In arm 4, which we refer to as the High arm, they received Rs 
50 per referral. In arms 2 and 3, the amount depended on the ethnicity of client the health 
volunteers recruited. In arm 2, which we refer to as the NudgeOther arm, the amount was higher 
for recruiting a client from a different ethnicity (an other-type referral) than for recruiting a client 
from their own ethnicity (an own-type referral). In arm 3, which we refer to as the NudgeOwn 
arm, the amount was higher for recruiting a client from their own ethnicity. As discussed in 
Section 1.1, arms NudgeOwn and NudgetOther allow us to compare how much additional effort 
health volunteers make when they are incentivized to recruit own-type clients and when they are 
incentivized to recruit other-type clients, relative to a baseline effort (arm Low). The comparison 
of arm Low and arm High allows us to examine the effect of higher, non-differential incentives 
on motivation in presence of ethnic heterogeneity. This examination is important in view of the 
common use of such incentives as a way to raise uptake of preventive health services in many 
programs, by governments as well as non-governmental organizations.  
To put the incentive amount in context, the health volunteers are generally not paid a 
salary but receive some incentives (not based on performance) from the government, including 
transport stipends for training and meeting allowances. In this study, the health volunteers were 
provided a lump sum of Rs 600 (approximately, US$ 6) on the day of the training to cover the 
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cost of transportation and to offset their opportunity cost of time that day. A semi-skilled worker 
in the area earns approximately Rs 400 per day, close to the Rs 8,000 per month minimum wage 
set by the government. If a health volunteer in arm Low recruited 50 clients, and if all showed 
up, she would receive Rs 1,000, which is 2.5 times the daily wage of a semi-skilled worker in the 
area.  
The second level of randomization is at the client level. We randomized incentives 
received by the clients for showing up for the sugar-level assessment. As discussed in Section 
1.1, this additional randomization allows us to evaluate the effect of incentives on the decision to 
appear for the sugar-level assessment and if incentives can help offset the barriers due to 
ethnicity from the clients’ perspective.  We sent each client an invitation letter that specified a 
randomly-assigned amount between Rs 20 and Rs 50 (in intervals of Rs 10) that the client would 
receive if she or he came to the health center for the checkup. The health volunteers gave clients 
the letter along with the referral card.  
We collected additional information on the health volunteers and the clients who came to 
the checkup using a survey. We held checkups in eight health centers. Nurses recruited for this 
experiment tested the blood sugar levels using a handheld Nova-Stat Glucometer. The Nova-Stat 
Glucometer has been found to be reliable and accurate for the determination of blood glucose 
levels (Rabiee et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the nurses advised those with high sugar levels to go to 
a hospital for further diagnosis.  
 
1.4 Empirical Approach 
1.4.1 Supply (Health Volunteer’s) Response 
In order to evaluate the extent of barriers to outreach effort that a health volunteer faces 
due to her ethnicity, we estimate two different equations below—one for own-type referrals and 
another for other-type referrals—and perform a number of tests.  
 
(1)   Yown, j = β1, own  + β2, own NudgeOtherj + β3, own NudgeOwnj + β4, own Highj +  n Xj + εj 
(2)   Yother, j = β1, other + β2, other NudgeOtherj + β3, other NudgeOwnj + β4, other Highj +  n Xj + εj 
 
In equations (1) and (2), Yown, j and Yother, j are the natural log of the number of own-type 
referrals and other-type referrals, respectively, made by a health volunteer j. To recapitulate, an 
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own-type referral is defined as a referral in which a health volunteer recruits a client from her 
own ethnic group. The arms differ by j and are mutually exclusive. Arm Low is the excluded arm 
in both equations. X includes a set of health volunteer characteristics which may influence their 
ability to recruit clients or their choice of the client. These include the health volunteer’s age, 
education level, experience, distance to the health center, ethnicity, occupation and household 
income. They also include the amount of money they received for their work as a health 
volunteer in the previous month, the number of households they usually visit per month and the 
number of advantaged and disadvantaged households in their ward based on the 2011 census. ε is 
the usual error term.  
To further check the validity of randomization and the stability of coefficients, we 
estimate equations (1) and (2) first without any covariates, then with variables used for 
stratification (ethnicity, age and education) and finally with additional covariates (age, 
occupation, number of households normally visited per month, amount received for work as a 
health volunteer the previous month, distance to the health center and the proportion of 
advantaged and disadvantaged households in the ward). For interpretation of the results, we use 
the coefficients from the fully-specified regressions. 
Using these two equations, we predict the number of own-type and other-type referrals 
for each arm. A formal test of the difference between the predicted number of own-type and 
other-type referrals in arm Low—i.e., at baseline—evaluates if there are barriers to outreach 
effort due to ethnicity. If there are no barriers, then the number of own-type and other-type 
referrals should not be different from each other at baseline (i.e., β1, own  = β1, other ). Likewise, a 
formal test of the difference between the predicted number of own-type referrals in arm Low 
(from equation (1)) and the predicted number of other-type referrals in NudgeOther (from 
equation (2)) assesses if it is possible to attain the same number of other-type referrals, through a 
differential incentive, as the number of own-type referrals at baseline. In other words, a test of 
whether β1, other + β2, other ≥ β1, own evaluates if we can eliminate the barriers that a health volunteer 
faces due to her ethnicity by providing her a differential incentive geared toward encouraging an 
other-type referral. A difference between the two numbers would also confirm further that the 
barriers are large—so large that even a differential incentive in the ratio of 2.5:1 (i.e., Rs 50/ Rs 
20) cannot fully eliminate. Finally, a test between the number of other-type referrals in arm Low 
 
9 
   
and the number of other-type referrals in arm High (i.e., β1, other = β4, own) can be used to evaluate 
if a higher, non-differential incentive helps offset the barriers that the health volunteer faces.   
 We estimate equations (1) and (2) separately using two different samples: first using all 
the clients who received a referral card from the health volunteers and then using only the clients 
who showed up to the checkup. We do so because the health volunteers’ effort can be understood 
as a combination of two parts: the effort she puts in reaching out to a client and the effort in 
convincing the client to visit the health center for the checkup. The first part can be measured by 
the number of referral cards the health volunteers distributed to the clients. The overall effort—
sum of the effort in reaching out and in convincing the client to go to the checkup—can be 
measured by the number of clients who showed up. The health volunteers were told that the 
amount of incentive they received would depend on the number of clients who showed up. 
However, the type of clients to whom they gave the referral cards differed in a number of 
characteristics (discussed in Section 1.6), making the decision to show up potentially 
endogenous. Therefore, it is logical to conduct analyses using both samples. One can also think 
of raising the uptake of healthcare services as a three-step process: reaching out to the clients, 
getting them to the healthcare center and providing them care. Ethnicity-related barriers can limit 
access and uptake at any of these points. Evaluating findings using the both outcomes, therefore, 
enables us to assess the relative strength of the barrier at two of these three steps.  
To estimate the asymmetric nature of the barrier—i.e., to compare the extent of barriers 
faced by an advantaged outreach worker when reaching out to a disadvantaged individual and by 
a disadvantaged outreach worker when reaching out to an advantaged individual—we include 
interaction terms between arms and the ethnic category of the health volunteer in equations in (1) 
and (2). We estimate:  
(3) Yown, j = β1, own  + β2, own NudgeOtherj + β3, own NudgeOwnj + β4, own Highj +   
β5, own Ethnicityj + (β6, own NudgeOtherj  Ethnicityj) + (β7, own NudgeOwnj  Ethnicityj) + 
(β8, own Highj  Ethnicityj) + n Xj + εj                                                              
(4) Yother, j = β1, other + β2, other NudgeOtherj + β3, other NudgeOwnj + β4, other Highj +  
β5, own Ethnicityj + (β6, other NudgeOtherj  Ethnicityj) + (β7, other NudgeOwnj  Ethnicityj) +  




   
 In equations (3) and (4), Ethnicity=1 if the health volunteer is from an advantaged group. 
If β7, own ≠ 0 in equation (3), an advantaged health volunteer and a disadvantaged health volunteer 
differ in terms of the amount of effort they put toward recruiting an own-type client. Likewise, if 
β6, other ≠ 0 in equation (4), an advantaged health volunteer and a disadvantaged health volunteer 
differ in terms of the amount of effort they put toward recruiting an other-type client.  
Differential incentives provided to health volunteers to change their behavior have the 
potential to distort the individuals’ behavior in a way that is inefficient. In this study’s setting, 
the health volunteers in NudgeOther and NudgeOwn arms, driven by financial motivation, can 
recruit other-type and own-type clients who are less likely to be diabetic. A health volunteer in 
the NudgeOther arm, for example, may recruit a healthy other-type client to receive the 
additional financial incentive, even though there may be other less healthy own-type clients.  In 
order to test if such behavior occurs, we compare the characteristics of the clients who came to 
the checkup between the arms (information on these characteristics is not available for clients 
who received a referral card but did not come to the checkup). In particular, we are interested in 
the diabetic status of patients on the extensive margin and the sugar level on the intensive 
margin. 
We compare the general characteristics and diabetic status of the clients recruited by the 
health volunteers in two ways. We compare the characteristics of clients in NudgeOther to those 
in NudgeOwn in order to see the difference in the composition and severity of clients based on 
who the health volunteers were incentivized to recruit with the differential incentives. Then we 
compare the characteristics of clients in NudgeOther and NudgeOwn to those in Low and High, 
in order to see the difference in the composition and severity of clients based on the nature of the 
incentives—differential versus non-differential. In these analyses, we cluster the standard errors 
at the health volunteer level.  
 
1.4.2 Demand (Clients’) Response 
On the clients’ side, the key outcome of interest is whether a client who received a 
referral card from a health volunteer showed up for the checkup. A client is either from the 
health volunteer’s ethnicity or not. In order to evaluate the general effect of the incentives and if 
a higher incentive encourages a client whose ethnicity is different than that of the health 
volunteer to come to the checkup, we estimate the following equation. 
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(5)  Yij = α + β1,demand Unmatchedij + β2,demand Amount of incentivei +  
β3,demand (Amount of incentivei  Unmatchedij) + n X + εj. 
In equation (5), Yij is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual i referred by health 
volunteer j showed up for the checkup and 0 otherwise. Unmatched=1 if health volunteer and the 
individual are from different ethnic categories and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of health volunteer 
characteristics. X also includes a categorical variable for the arm that the health volunteer 
belongs to because health volunteers in different arms may put different effort toward convincing 
the client to come to the checkup, which in turn may affect the client’s decision. Here, too, we 
cluster the standard errors at the health volunteer level. 
Clients from the same ethnic category as that of the health volunteer can be expected to 
be more likely to show up than those from a different ethnic category. Therefore, in equation (5), 
we expect β1,demand<0. Because the clients receiving a higher incentive should be more likely to 
show up, we expect β2,demand>0. We hypothesize that, with higher incentives, clients who are 
from a different ethnic category than that of the health volunteer will be more likely to show up 
than at lower incentives, therefore β3,demand>0.  
 
1.5 Descriptive Statistics and the Validity of Randomization 
Of the 72 health volunteers who had been randomized into four groups, 69 showed up for 
the training and were recruited for the experiment. The three health volunteers who did not show 
up were one each from arm Low, arm NudgeOther and arm High.  Of the 69 health volunteers, 
43 (62 percent) were from the advantaged ethnic category, while the remaining 26 (38 percent) 
were from the disadvantaged category (Table 1.2). In the analytical sample, on average, a health 
volunteer is 46 years old and has 19 years of experience.  All are women. Less than one-third of 
health volunteers have education equivalent to the school leaving certificate (equivalent to the 
sophomore year of high school in the United States) and 10% have only informal education. On 
average, a health volunteer in the sample visited 50 households in the month preceding the 
survey and lives half an hour away from the nearest local health center. Seventy-eight percent of 
health volunteers received honorarium for their work in the month before the survey, 82 percent 
of health volunteers reported agriculture as their main occupation, and 20 percent said at least 
one of their nearest five neighbors was from a different ethnic group than their own.  
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The health volunteers distributed the referral cards to 2,825 clients (average = 40.9 cards 
per health volunteer).  Of these, 2,403 (85.1 percent) showed up for the checkup and 2,365 (98.4 
percent of all those who showed up) were interviewed. The remaining 38 include clients who 
showed up after the interviewers had left. For clients who received the cards from the health 
volunteers but did not show up, we have data on their ethnicity and the amount of incentive they 
would have received for showing up. Of the 2,365 clients who were interviewed, information on 
some of the covariates is missing for a total of 29 clients, leaving a final, complete analytical 
sample of 2,336 (97.2 percent of all clients who showed up and 98.7 percent of all clients who 
were interviewed).  
Among those who showed up and provided complete information, 60 percent of clients 
are women, the average age is 52 years, and 56 percent are from advantaged ethnic category 
(Table 1.2). Sixty-six percent are from the same ethnic category as that of the health volunteer. 
Eighty-eight percent are married and the average education level is grade 4. On average, clients 
live 27 minutes away from the nearest health center, 82 percent are engaged in agriculture and 61 
percent had heard about diabetes before. Almost all of them heard about the sugar-level 
checkups from their health volunteer. In 98 percent cases, the health volunteer visited the 
individual at home to talk about diabetes and to give the referral card and the letter.  
Randomization divided the health volunteers into four similar arms (Appendix 1.B, Table 
B1). For many health volunteer’s, their actual experience, age and the level of education—self-
reported during the interviews—were different from the information collected from the health 
centers before randomization (not shown). However, the arms are generally balanced based on 
self-reported experience, age and the level of education collected from the health volunteers 
individually at the time of the training. Surprisingly, there is a monotonic decrease in age and 
experience going from arm Low to arm High, but that is due to chance, and we control for 
these—and other characteristics of the health volunteers—in the regression analysis. The first set 
of p-values is from a joint orthogonality test of all arms. The p-values in the last column are from 
the test of difference in means between arms NudgeOther and NudgeOwn, the critical two arms 
required to draw inference on the health volunteers’ differential response to differential financial 
incentives.  
On the demand side, the health volunteers in all arms had similar probabilities of 
receiving letters offering Rs 20, Rs 30, Rs 40 and Rs 50, which confirms the validity of 
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randomization of incentives to the clients (Appendix 1.B, Figure B1). There is no evidence that 
the health volunteers opened the envelopes beforehand to give letters mentioning a higher 
amount to their own-type clients—the proportion of envelopes going to own-type clients were 
64.7 percent for Rs 20, 66 percent for Rs 30, 63.2 percent for Rs 40 and 64.4 percent for Rs 50. 
In fact, the characteristics of clients who received different amounts are also balanced, except in 
the proportion of clients who reported that they had heard about diabetes even before the health 
volunteers visited them (Appendix 1.B, Table B2). 
 
1.6 Main Empirical Results 
1.6.1 Extent of the Barriers due to Ethnicity 
Based on the clients who received a referral card and controlling for the characteristics of 
the health volunteers, at baseline (i.e., in the Low arm), they recruited 20 own-type clients and 12 
other-type clients. The own-type and other-type referrals at baseline were, therefore, in the ratio 
of 5:3 (Table 1.3). The difference is statistically significant at the 5% significance level 
(p<0.001).  
With a differential incentive in the ratio of 5:2 (i.e., Rs 50/Rs 20) geared toward 
encouraging the outreach workers to recruit a client from an ethnicity different than their own, 
other-type referrals increase by 11.6% (statistically insignificant). Even with this increment, 
however, the other-type referrals are lower than own-type referrals at baseline (p value from a 
test of difference, between own-type referrals at baseline and other-type referrals with a 
differential incentive, is 0.014).  
Both of these findings suggest that the barriers due to ethnicity are high in this setting. It 
is not the case of the health volunteers not responding at all to the incentives. In fact, they are 
very responsive to incentives in general, as reflected by their response to a differential incentive 
geared toward encouraging an own-type referral. On the log scale, the mean number of own-type 
and other-type referrals at baseline translate to 3 and 2.5, respectively.  Own-type referrals 
increased by approximately 48% from Low (baseline) to NudgeOwn (higher incentives for own-
type referral) (Table 1.3, Panel A). We obtain this estimate by taking the exponent of the 
coefficient and subtracting one from the result. The corresponding change in other-type referrals 
from Low to NudgeOther (higher incentives for other-type referrals) is 12%. If these proportional 
increments reflect the additional amount of effort made by health volunteers in response to the 
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incentives, the effort they made when they were incentivized to recruit other-type clients was 
about one-fourth (=12/48) of the effort they made when they were incentivized to recruit own-
type clients. The price change was 150% (i.e., went up from Rs 20 to Rs 50) in both cases, which 
means that the elasticity is 0.32 (=48/150) for own-type referrals and 0.08 for other-type 
referrals.  
The extent of barrier is similarly high when it is measured based on the number of clients 
who showed up for the checkups (Appendix 1.C, Table C1). In this case, the baseline own-type 
and other-type referrals are in the ratio of 3:2 and are statistically different from each other (p-
value = 0.003). The difference persists even with a differential incentive geared toward 
encouraging an other-type referral; the p-value from the test of difference, between own-type 
referrals at baseline and other-type referral with a differential incentive, is less than 0.001.  
 
1.6.2 Effect of Non-Differential Incentives 
We find that higher, non-differential incentives can be counterproductive in offsetting the 
barriers due to ethnicity. When the incentive amount is increased from Rs 20/referral (Low) to Rs 
50/referral (High), the number of own-type referrals remains unchanged. However, the number 
of other-type referrals falls by a statistically significant amount (Table 1.3); the coefficient of -
0.791 on High in Table 1.3 corresponds to an approximately 55 percent reduction in the number 
of other-type referrals from baseline. The corresponding decline based on the clients who came 
to the health center for the sugar-level assessment is 59 percent. In terms of the ethnic 
composition of the clients, from Low to High, the share of other-type clients falls from 42 
percent to 27.5 percent based on the sample of clients who received a referral card. We return to 
these striking results in the discussion section. 
 
1.6.3 Asymmetry in the Extent of the Barrier 
The study’s setup enables us to analyze the asymmetric nature of the barriers that 
traditionally advantaged individuals face when they interact with those from traditionally 
disadvantaged individuals, and vice versa. The regression results from estimating equations (3) 
and (4) are in Appendix 1.D, Table D1.  
For a visual comparison of the difference in the behavior of advantaged and 
disadvantaged health volunteers, we plotted the natural log of the predicted number of referrals 
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from equations (3) and (4) against the amount of incentive provided to the health volunteers. As 
seen in Figures 1.1(a) and 1.1(b), the two types of health volunteers had similar responses when 
they were provided a higher incentive for own-type referrals. However, they differed in their 
response to the incentive geared toward encouraging an other-type referral. The coefficients on 
NudgeOwn and NudgeOther are not statistically different from one another for the advantaged 
health volunteers but they are for the disadvantaged health volunteers. For the advantaged health 
volunteers, the number of own-type referrals at baseline and the number of other-type referrals 
with a NudgeOther incentive are statistically not different from each other. This suggests that, 
although the barriers due to ethnicity are high in general, it is possible to improve the access of 
disadvantaged groups to health services by providing differential incentives to the advantaged 
health volunteers. For the disadvantaged health volunteers, an incentive geared toward 
encouraging an other-type referral decreased the number of other-type referrals (compared to 
Low). According to Table D1, based on the sample of clients who came to the checkup, the 
disadvantaged health volunteers reduced the number of other-type (advantaged to them) referrals 
by a statistically significant 65 percent.   
 
1.6.4 Effect of Incentives on the Type of Clients Reached 
On the extensive margin, among the clients who showed up, clients recruited by the 
health volunteers in NudgeOther and NudgeOwn—in which the health volunteers received 
differential incentives—were more likely to be diabetic (Table 1.4). The mean probability of 
being diabetic among those in Low and High is five percent. The clients recruited by NudgeOther 
and NudgeOwn health volunteers were about two percentage points more likely (or about 6.9 
percent likely) to be diabetic.  
However, we do not find any difference in the diabetic status of clients recruited by 
health volunteers in NudgeOwn and NudgeOther arms. We also do not find any effect of the type 
of incentives on the intensive margin—conditional on the client being diabetic, there was no 
difference in the sugar level of the client recruited by the health volunteers in NudgeOwn and 
NudgeOther arms, or between those recruited by health volunteers receiving differential or non-
differential incentives.  
In terms of the general characteristics, health volunteers in NudgeOther recruited older, 
less-educated clients and fewer women than did health volunteers in NudgeOwn (Appendix 1.E, 
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Table E1). In this setting, the incentives to recruit other-type clients also seem to have 
encouraged the health volunteers to reach out to clients who otherwise are usually less likely to 
go for the checkup, such as women and older, less-educated individuals.  Compared to the non-
differential incentives (Low and High), the differential incentives (NudgeOther and NudgeOwn) 
encouraged the health volunteers to reach out to younger, slightly more educated clients but who 
lived further from the health posts.  
 
1.6.5 Effect of Incentives on Demand (Decision to Access Services) 
On the demand side, overall, the incentives to the clients—in the range tested, i.e., 
between Rs 20 and Rs 50—were inconsequential in affecting the clients’ behavior (Table 1.5). 
Even controlling for health volunteer’s arms and other characteristics, the standard errors on the 
key variables—interaction of matching ethnicity and incentive amount—are large, and the R-
squared values reveal that a negligible portion of the variation in outcome is explained by the 
incentives, ethnic match between the health volunteer and the client, and the characteristics of 
the health volunteer. The estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant at the conventional 
5% significance level. There is suggestive evidence that financial incentives to the clients may 
have reduced, not increased, their chances of coming to the checkup. As expected, the mismatch 
in the ethnicity of the health volunteer and the client seems to reduce the chances of the client 
appearing for the checkup. Because the coefficient on incentives and ethnic match are not in the 
opposite direction, the discussion of whether incentives help offset the barriers on the part of the 
client is not relevant.  
 
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Using a unique experimental setup, we showed that the difference in the ethnicity of 
health outreach workers and the prospective patients constitutes a significant barrier to health 
services utilization. At baseline, health outreach workers recruited a significantly higher number 
of clients from their own ethnic category than from a different ethnic category. Even a 
differential incentive in the ratio of 5:2, geared toward encouraging the health outreach workers 
to recruit an other-type client, was insufficient to offset the barrier. The health volunteers do 
respond to financial incentives in general, as suggested by the statistically significant increase in 
the number of own-type referrals in response to incentives encouraging such referrals; they just 
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do not respond in a similar manner when they are incentivized to reach across ethnic lines. At a 
higher, non-differential incentive, the health volunteers reduced the number of other-type 
referrals, suggesting that such incentives can be counterproductive in reducing barriers due to 
ethnicity.  
In many cases, the policy goal is to reach out to the traditionally disadvantaged groups— 
rather than simultaneously encouraging advantaged workers to reach out to disadvantaged 
groups and encouraging the disadvantaged workers to reach out to advantaged ones. Our sub-
group analysis shows that differential incentives to the advantaged outreach workers have the 
potential to meet such goals. For the advantaged health volunteers, the differential incentive in 
the ratio of 5:2, geared toward encouraging them to recruit disadvantaged clients enabled them to 
offset the baseline differences in own-type versus other-type referrals. Such differential 
incentives do not have adverse effects on efficiency—in fact, the health volunteers receiving a 
differential incentive recruited clients who were more likely to be diabetic than those recruited 
by health volunteers receiving a non-differential incentive.  
The study’s findings, especially the magnitude of the effects, may have limited external 
validity given that it was conducted in a specific setting in Nepal, and therefore should be 
interpreted accordingly. Nepal’s health volunteers are anecdotally known for working effectively 
even across ethnic lines; if that is the case, the estimates of the barrier we present here should be 
taken as the lower bound of the barriers that prevail in many other settings. Nonetheless, the 
methodological approach we adopted – differential incentives based on the ethnicity of the 
individual that a client interacts with – may be applied to several settings, both as a way to 
evaluate the extent of barriers due to ethnicity and to reduce those barriers. Examples of potential 
applications include efforts to raise diversity in universities and to raise the uptake of 
government services by minority groups.  
Our study has a number of striking findings that warrant further research. Perhaps the 
most striking finding is that the disadvantaged health volunteers’ recruited fewer of the other-
type (i.e., advantaged clients) when they were incentivized to recruit the other-type, even 
compared to the baseline. This was not expected, but is consistent with the presence of 
“stereotype threat”, a phenomenon in which emphasizing the status of an individual and making 
it more salient reinforces a behavior associated with that status. Such effects have been found 
elsewhere. In India, for example, Hoff and Pandey (2005) find that publicly emphasizing 
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students’ caste to them created a large and robust gap in performance. Lower caste students 
performed more poorly when their caste was mentioned to them publicly. Incentives may have 
played a similar role in this study by making the notions of identity and intra-ethnic bonds more 
salient for the disadvantaged health volunteers. When we explained to the disadvantaged health 
volunteers that they would receive a higher amount if they referred an advantaged client, they 
may have inferred that we expected them to face barriers when making such referrals. In general, 
the asymmetric nature of the barrier warrants further research, including along other 
demographic differences, such as gender, race and economic status, which are key determinants 
of health status.  
Second, the high, non-differential incentive encouraged health volunteers to reduce the 
number of other-type referrals compared to the number of referrals at the low, non-differential 
incentive. This is consistent with the target income hypothesis, whereby the health volunteers 
may have recruited the number of clients necessary for them to meet their target income. One 
can also hypothesize that with higher incentives, the stakes of the client not showing up increase 
and as a result the health volunteers opted to invest more time to convince their own-type clients 
to come to the checkup, thereby reducing the number of other-type referrals. From an immediate 
policy perspective, this finding raises questions about the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
improving access to care for minority groups. The dominant form of incentives used currently in 
many part of the world is non-differential. If the outreach workers are predominantly from 
traditionally advantaged or majority groups, the current incentives may be exacerbating, not 
ameliorating, the existing health disparities.  
Third, the finding that incentives to the clients—which were exogenous—had no or even 
a negative effect on the decision to come to the checkup also warrants further research. It is 
possible that the amount of incentive offered to the clients signaled the service’s quality, with a 
higher incentives signaling lower quality. It is also possible that the lowest incentive amount 
provided to the client – Rs 20 – was already high enough in terms of offsetting the costs they 
faced when going for the checkup, and therefore the additional amount had no effect on their 
decision. This second argument is consistent with the high uptake in this study—approximately 
85% of the clients approached by the health volunteers came to the sugar-level assessment.  
Returning to the policy issue of whether the health volunteers in Nepal can be mobilized 
in response to the shifting burden of diseases toward non-communicable ones—in a manner they 
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were so successfully mobilized to help reduce child and maternal mortality—the high uptake 
found in this study is encouraging. It suggests that the health volunteers can continue to play an 
important role in encouraging preventive health behavior. The policy challenge now is to build 
an incentive structure so that the significant disparities prevalent in the uptake of common, 
communicable diseases and their outcomes do not extend to the newer, non-communicable 
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Fig. 1.2 Supply Response to Financial Incentives
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Refer own-type Low Low High High  
Refer other-type Low High Low High 
 
The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was approximately US$ 1: 
Nepalese rupees (Rs) 100. Low – Rs 20/referral; High – Rs 50/referral.  
 
Table 1.2.  Summary Statistics for the Analytic Sample   
 Mean SD 
Health Volunteers (N=69)   
Age, years 46.09 9.28 
Experience, years 18.96 7.54 
Education higher than grade 10 (yes=1) 0.28 0.45 
Had informal schooling (yes=1) 0.10 0.30 
Ethnicity (Advantaged=1) 0.62 0.49 
Number of household visited per month 50.26 42.65 
Received money for work as HV in the previous month 0.78 0.42 
Distance to the health center, minutes 29.74 19.89 
Primary occupation is agriculture (yes=1) 0.83 0.38 
Has one of five neighbors from a different ethnicity 0.20 0.41 
   
Clients (N=2,336)   
Gender (female=1) 0.60 0.49 
Age, years 52.07 12.34 
Ethnicity (advantaged=1) 0.56 0.50 
Same ethnic category as that of the HV 0.66 0.47 
Marital status (married=1) 0.89 0.31 
Years of schooling 4.11 4.64 
Distance to the health center, minutes 26.94 24.30 
Primary occupation is agriculture (yes=1) 0.82 0.38 
Knew about diabetes before the HV's visit 0.61 0.49 
Knew about the checkup from the HV 0.99 0.09 
HV informed the client by visiting the client's house 0.98 0.12 
Note: Clients include individuals who received a referral card from a HV, 
showed up for the checkup and answered the questionnaire administered by 
the research team. As mentioned in the text, of the 2,803 individuals who 
received a referral card, 2,403 showed up. Of those, 2,336 provided complete 





   
Table 1.3. Regression Results of Log of Referrals on Incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Own-type referrals     
Baseline mean = 2.99 (no. of referrals = 19.9)  
NudgeOther -0.066 -0.102 -0.034 
 (0.206) (0.203) (0.185) 
 
NudgeOwn 0.334 0.392* 0.389** 
 (0.203) (0.201) (0.193) 
 
High 0.255 0.315 0.106 
 (0.206) (0.214) (0.201) 
 
R-squared 0.08 0.17 0.45 
    
B. Other-type referrals (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline mean = 2.50 (no. of referrals = 12.2)  
NudgeOther 0.185 0.189 0.110 
 (0.318) (0.319) (0.333) 
 
NudgeOwn -0.519 -0.567* -0.897** 
 (0.313) (0.316) (0.348) 
 
High -0.434 -0.634* -0.791** 
 (0.318) (0.337) (0.362) 
 
R-squared 0.10  0.16  0.27  
 
Additional covariates (for both panels)    
Stratification variables No Yes Yes 
Other HV characteristics No No Yes 
Note. The results in this table are from estimating equations (1) and (2), and the sample is based on all 
clients who received a referral card from their health volunteer. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Stratification variables include ethnicity, experience and education. 
Other health volunteer characteristics include age, annual household income, number of households the 
health volunteer visited in the past month, the amount of money she received for working as a health 
volunteer, distance to the nearest health center, primary occupation and the share of own-type 






   
 
 
Table 1.4. Effect of Type of Incentives on the Types of Clients Recruited 
 
Diabetic status 
Sugar level (for diabetic 
patients) 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
NudgeOther 0.004 0.003 -12.5 -15.4 
(comparison group: NudgeOwn) (0.012) (0.012) (14.2) (16.7) 
Excluded group mean 0.07  0.07  96.3  96.3  
R-squared 0.02  0.02  0.19  0.24  
N 1155  1155  80  80  
     
NudgeOwn and NudgeOther 0.020** 0.022*** 3.9  1.6  
(Comparison group: Low and High) (0.008) (0.008) (8.0) (8.7) 
Excluded group mean 0.05  0.05  95.0  95.0  
R-squared 0.01  0.01  0.11  0.14  
N 2297  2297  136  136  
     
Additional covariates (both panels)    
Health volunteer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics No Yes No Yes 
     
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, 
clustered at the health volunteer level, are in parenthesis. The health volunteer characteristics include 
ethnicity, experience, education, age, annual household income, number of households the health 
volunteer visited in the past month, the amount of money she received for working as a health 
volunteer, distance to the nearest health center and primary occupation. Individual characteristics 






   
 







Mean probability of coming to the checkup 0.85  0.88  0.82  
    
Incentive amount, Rs -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0026* 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015) 
    
Client and HV from different ethnic categories -0.0442 -0.0101 -0.0828 
 (0.0466) (0.0804) (0.0770) 
    
 Incentive amount  Client and HV from different groups  0.0011 -0.0007 0.0034* 
 (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
    
Health volunteer's characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Health center fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Health volunteer's incentive arm Yes Yes Yes 
    
R-squared 0.06  0.05  0.08  
N 2,755  1,507  1,248  
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. They are clustered at the health volunteer level. The health volunteer characteristics 
include ethnicity, experience, education, age, annual household income, number of households the 
health volunteer visited in the past month, the amount of money she received for working as a health 
volunteer, distance to the nearest health center and primary occupation. Individual characteristics 








   
Appendices 
Appendix 1.A. Implementation Details 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, we randomly assigned 72 health volunteers into four arms 
stratified by their ethnic category (advantaged vs disadvantaged), education, and age. We 
stratified in order to ensure that each arm had a reasonable number of health volunteers from the 
traditionally advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups.  We collected information on 
ethnicity, education, and age before the experiment from local health centers.  
We invited the health volunteers for one-day training at their local health center. A 
practicing endocrinologist provided information to the health volunteers—in Nepali, the 
dominant local language—on basic risk factors for diabetes, prevention, symptoms and 
implications if not treated on time.  
Two days before the checkup, the research team visited the health volunteers at their 
home and explained them the incentive structure in private. The health volunteers were requested 
not to share their incentive structure with other health volunteers, so that one health volunteer’s 
behavior was not influenced by the knowledge of what other volunteers were receiving. 
Anecdotal evidence showed that the health volunteers complied with this request, partly because 
the health volunteers themselves did not want the community to know that they were receiving a 
monetary reward for their work. We did not reveal the specific objectives of the study and the 
incentive structure even to the research staff.  
Each health volunteer was told that she would receive an amount of money based on the 
number of clients who came for the checkup at their local health center on the pre-specified date 
and time, and according to the schedule in Table 1.1.   
The second level of randomization is at the client level. We randomized incentives 
received by the clients for showing up for the sugar-level assessment. We sent each client an 
invitation letter which specified a randomly-assigned amount between Rs 20 and Rs 50 (in 
intervals of Rs 10) the client would receive if she or he came to the health center for the checkup. 
We put letters mentioning these amounts in envelopes, shuffled them and created stacks of 50 
envelopes each.  
We gave these 50 letters along with 50 referral cards to each health volunteer. We told 
them not to open the letters to the clients so that they did not selectively give letters with higher 
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amounts to clients who were more (or less) likely to show up. Without opening the envelopes, it 
was not possible to know the amount mentioned in the letter.  
We told the health volunteers that they could call the research team if they needed more 
cards and letters or if the clients had questions. None of them called. We gave each health 
volunteer a day to recruit clients. If the checkup was scheduled for Friday morning, for example, 
the health volunteer received the referral cards and the letters on Wednesday afternoon. We kept 
this window for recruitment short partly to ensure that the health volunteers in smaller wards did 
not visit all households in their wards (for, if they did, we would not know if the mix of clients 
received is because of a differential effort made by the health volunteer or simply because she 
referred everyone in her ward) and to reduce the chances of interaction between the health 
volunteers.  
To keep track of all clients to whom the health volunteers provided the referral cards, the 
referral card had the design of a boarding pass (Figure 1.A1). The health volunteers gave one 
part of the card to clients and kept the other part. In the part that she kept, the volunteer was 
asked to write the name and contact information of the individual she spoke to and the code on 
the envelope that she gave the individual. The research team collected the cards from the health 
centers at the time of the checkup and from the volunteers the same morning.  
Figure 1.A1.  The Referral Card  
 
ID Number 
                
 
 
For use by the Female Community 
Health Volunteer 
 







Free Diabetes Checkup 
      ID Number  
                
 
Dear Mr/Mrs ..........................., 
 
Please bring this card, along with the letter provided to you 
by your health volunteer, when you come to the free 




Time: 7 am (please fast overnight and do not eat 
anything before coming to the checkup)  
 






   
We collected additional information on the health volunteers and the clients who came to 
the checkup using a survey. We administered the survey to the health volunteers on the day of 
their training and to the clients when they appeared for the checkup.  
The coding system in referral cards, the envelopes and the survey questionnaire allowed 
us to match each individual client to the health volunteer, to know how many clients each health 
volunteer recruited and how many showed up, and to know the financial incentives the clients 
received (or would have received, for those who did not come).  
We held checkups in eight health centers. On a pre-specified date—which we 
communicated to the health volunteers after finalizing it with the health center administrators—
the research team consisting of eight practicing nurses, 20 trained interviewers, two other 
research staff, and the author went to the centers to conduct the checkup and to administer the 
survey to the clients who came. We reached each health post by 7 am. Each individual who 
appeared was first read the consent form, interviewed and then sent to a separate room for the 
sugar-level assessment and to receive the financial incentive. The nurses tested the blood sugar 
levels using a handheld Nova-Stat Glucometer and advised those with high sugar levels to go to 
a hospital for further diagnosis.  Interviews stopped around 9:45 am to allow the health centers to 
open for regular business at 10 am. Individuals who showed up after the interviewers had left the 
health center were read the consent form, administered the test and provided with the financial 
incentive, but were not interviewed.  
We paid the incentive to the clients at the time of the checkup and to the health volunteer 
three weeks after the experiment. For ethical reasons, we provided the same amount to all health 
volunteers. However, throughout the experiment, the health volunteers did not know that they 




   
Appendix 1.B. Evidence on the Validity of Randomization 
Table 1.B1. Balance in Key Characteristics of the Health Volunteers between the Arms 
 Low 
Nudge-    
Other 








Age, years 49.35 47.76 45.78 41.47 0.07 0.54 
  (1.74) (2.64) (1.83) (2.36)   
       
Experience, years 21.29 20.47 19.17 14.88 0.06 0.58 
  (1.72) (1.46) (1.81) (1.97)   
       
Education higher than grade 10 (yes=1) 0.24 0.18 0.28 0.41 0.48 0.48 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)   
       
Had informal schooling (yes=1) 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.62 0.26 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)   
       
Ethnicity (Advantaged=1) 0.65 0.65 0.56 0.65 0.93 0.58 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)   
       
Income category 2.29 2.18 1.94 1.88 0.45 0.31 
  (0.19) (0.15) (0.21) (0.26)   
       
Number of household visited per month 38.29 56.59 58.78 46.88 0.48 0.88 
  (9.69) (10.82) (9.39) (11.30)   
       
Received money in the previous month 0.88 0.88 0.67 0.71 0.27 0.13 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)   
       
Distance to the health center, minutes 27.94 37.65 29.56 23.82 0.23 0.28 
  (3.79) (6.16) (4.10) (4.63)   
       
Primary occupation is agriculture 0.76 0.88 0.78 0.88 0.70 0.41 
  (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)   
              
Note: The p-values in column (5) are from the joint orthogonality test of the arms. The p-values in column (6) 
are from the t-test of the difference in means between the NudgeOwn and the NudgeOther arms. All variables 
reported here were self-reported by the HVs. Income was categorized into four groups: 1 - less than 50,000 per 
year; 2 - 50,000-100,000 per year; 3 - 100,000-200,000 per year; 4 - 200,000-500,000 per year; and 5 - more than 
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Table 1.B2. Balance in Key Covariates between the Clients Receiving Different Amounts 




Age, years 52.54 51.68 51.85 52.41 0.448 
  (0.51) (0.49) (0.53) (0.53)  
      
Women, proportion of total 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.795 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
      
Currently married, proportion 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.875 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
      
Education, years 3.95 4.26 4.43 3.87 0.149 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)  
      
Distance to the health center, minutes 28.54 26.67 25.71 27.11 0.227 
  (1.07) (0.97) (0.96) (1.10)  
      
Farming as main occupation, proportion 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.164 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
      
Had heard about diabetes, proportion  0.59 0.62 0.68 0.56 0.002 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
      
Blood sugar level, mg/dL 94.84 95.79 96.73 95.72 0.780 
  (0.91) (0.93) (1.38) (0.98)  
      
Blood sugar level > 110 mg/dL, proportion 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.934 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  
            
Note: The p-values in column (5) are from the joint orthogonality test of the arms.  The numbers 









   
Appendix 1.C. Main Results Based on the Sample of Clients Who Came to the Checkup 
 
Table 1.C1. Regression Results of Log of Referrals on Incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Own-type referrals     
Baseline mean = 2.80 (no. of referrals = 16.5)  
NudgeOther -0.126 -0.166 -0.091 
 (0.228) (0.222) (0.204) 
 
NudgeOwn 0.372 0.443** 0.448** 
 (0.225) (0.220) (0.213) 
 
High 0.308 0.368 0.125 
 (0.228) (0.234) (0.222) 
R-squared 0.09 0.20 0.47 
    
B. Other-type referrals (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline mean = 2.39 (no. of referrals = 10.9)  
NudgeOther -0.125 -0.117 -0.074 
 (0.327) (0.331) (0.347) 
 
NudgeOwn -0.491 -0.541 -0.717* 
 (0.323) (0.328) (0.363) 
 
High -0.529 -0.710** -0.897** 
 (0.327) (0.350) (0.377) 
R-squared 0.06  0.10  0.22  
Additional covariates    
Stratification variables No Yes Yes 
Other HV characteristics No No Yes 
Note: N=69. The results in this table are from estimating equations (1) and (2), and the sample is based 
on all clients who came to the health center for the sugar-level assessment. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Stratification variables include ethnicity, experience and 
education. Other health volunteer characteristics include age, annual household income, number of 
households the health volunteer visited in the past month, the amount of money she received for 
working as a health volunteer, distance to the nearest health center, primary occupation and the share of 





   
Appendix 1.D. Results on the Asymmetric Effect of the Incentives on Advantaged and 
Disadvantaged Health Volunteers 
 
Table 1.D1. Response to Incentives by Health Volunteers' Ethnicity 
 Based on all clients 
who received a card 
Based on clients who 









     
NudgeOther (β2) 0.168 -0.51 -0.018 -1.010* 
 (0.330) (0.581) (0.365) (0.591) 
NudgeOwn (β3) 0.466 -1.397** 0.644* -1.316** 
 (0.309) (0.544) (0.342) (0.554) 
High (β4) 0.155 -1.698** 0.25 -2.093*** 
 (0.365) (0.643) (0.404) (0.654) 
Advantaged (β5) 0.372 -0.823 0.523 -0.904 
 (0.310) (0.546) (0.343) (0.556) 
Advantaged  NudgeOther (β6) -0.319 1.014 -0.115 1.526* 
 (0.432) (0.761) (0.478) (0.774) 
Advantaged   NudgeOwn (β7) -0.133 0.777 -0.324 0.924 
 (0.393) (0.692) (0.435) (0.704) 
Advantaged  High (β8) -0.071 1.294* -0.19 1.699** 
 (0.431) (0.759) (0.476) (0.772) 
     
Additional covariates     
Stratification variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other health volunteer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.30 
N 69 69 69 69 
Note. The Greek letters next to the variable names correspond to those in equations (3) and 
(4).  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Stratification 
variables include ethnicity, experience and education. Other health volunteer characteristics 
include age, annual household income, number of households the health volunteer visited in 
the past month, the amount of money she received for working as a health volunteer, 
distance to the nearest health center, primary occupation and the share of own-type 






   
Appendix 1.E. Effect of Incentives on the General Mix of Clients 
 
Table 1.E1. Effect of Incentives on the Type of Patients Reached by the Health Volunteers 
         
p-values from the test of 


















Age, years 53.08 52.28 50.11 53.11 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
  (0.48) (0.57) (0.49) (0.49)    
        
Women, proportion of total 0.61 0.55 0.65 0.60 0.01 <0.01 0.90 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
        
Married clients, proportion of total 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.55 1.00 0.99 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
        
Education, years 3.84 4.04 4.54 3.98 0.04 0.07 0.03 
  (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20)    
        
Distance to the health center, minutes 25.43 29.99 27.93 24.21 <0.01 0.17 <0.01 
  (0.91) (1.26) (0.87) (0.97)    
        
Farming as main occupation, 
proportion 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.72 0.38 0.86 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
        
Had heard about diabetes, proportion  0.60 0.62 0.63 0.58 0.38 0.68 0.10 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
                
Note: All numbers in this table are for individuals who received a referral card from a HV and showed up for the 




















2 Early Childhood Nutrition to Adult Outcomes: An Exploration 





There is now a critical threshold of evidence documenting the relationship between one’s 
exposure to shocks in early life and outcomes in adulthood. In a seminal review article, Currie 
and Vogl (2012) summarize the work done so far on the relationship between early-life nutrition, 
famine, rainfall, pollution, disease and war, and long-term health outcomes, primarily height. 
Based on their extensive review, they argue that “[F]uture research should focus on identifying 
pathways and mechanisms; measuring the relative magnitudes of the effects of different health 
shocks; examining interactions between shocks; and revisiting the question of critical periods” 
(p. 29).  This paper contributes to the existing literature responding to that call. The first goal of 
this paper is to examine the effect of an early-life nutritional intervention on health outcomes that 
the intervention is intended to affect directly as evidenced by the medical literature, thereby 
elucidating on a clear mechanism. A second goal is to assess the effect of age at first exposure to 
the intervention, again on expected health outcomes, to get at the role of critical periods.  In 
many countries with a history of discrimination and unequal access to resources based on gender 
and ethnicity, it is natural to expect different effects of the program on these dimensions. 
Therefore, the final goal is to evaluate heterogeneous effects of the program by gender and by 
ethnicity. In addition to the effect on health outcomes, I also evaluate the effect on education 
outcomes to check whether the findings here are consistent with the vast amount of literature 
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showing that healthier children tend to be healthier adults with better educational and labor 
market outcomes.    
I make use of a vitamin A supplementation program in Nepal, which the government of 
Nepal implemented with funding support from development partners, primarily the United States 
Agency for International Aid (USAID). The program was rolled out in a sequential manner 
across districts between 1993 and 2001 and targeted 6-60 months old children. Children who 
were already five years of age at the time of program’s implementation did not benefit from the 
program. The main empirical strategy in this paper capitalizes on this rollout and its differential 
effect on children of different ages within the same household based on the geographic location 
(district) of their birth. I link individuals from the 2011 census to their district and year of birth, 
which allows me to determine whether they benefited from the program and, if they did, the age 
which they were exposed to the program. The self-reported measures in 2011 are used as the 
long-term outcomes.  
Immediate health effects are likely the most important channels through which early-life 
interventions such as this supplementation program can affect educational and labor market 
outcomes. The primary result of vitamin A deficiency is blindness. With secondary effects such 
as reduced immune system, temporary low vision can easily translate to permanent disability if 
the condition is not treated on time. Therefore, I start by evaluating the effect of the program on 
blindness and disability. I then evaluate the effect on several educational outcomes, as discussed 
in Section 2.4.  
To preview the results, I find that the program reduced the probability of having a 
disability or blindness, kept children in school longer, and enabled them to complete different 
grades by an expected age. The positive effects on disability and education seem to have 
improved marriage prospects, as reflected in the individual’s marital status in 2011. The program 
also had different effects on individuals based on their timing of the exposure to the program, 
with a longer exposure usually strengthening the positive effects. As expected, effects also 
differed by the individual’s gender and ethnicity. They were more pronounced for men and 




   
2.2 Nepal’s Vitamin A Supplementation Program 
The details of Nepal’s vitamin A Supplementation Program (hereafter, the program), 
including how it was conceived, have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Thapa, Choe 
and Retherford, 2005; Center for Global Development, 2014). Therefore, I provide only a 
summary here. The program evolved from an extensive consultation between Nepal’s 
government, development partners and the health community and a recognition of prior 
evidence—mostly from other countries—illustrating that vitamin A supplementation can help 
reduce child mortality significantly. The program’s primary goal was to reduce child mortality 
and morbidity related to vitamin A deficiency by providing twice-yearly supplements of vitamin 
A capsules to children who were 6-60 months old; treating xerophthalmia, severe malnutrition, 
prolonged diarrhea and measles; and encouraging dietary intake of vitamin A and breast-feeding 
(United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2003). The program started in October 1993 in 
eight districts and was subsequently rolled out to other districts, covering 69 of the 75 districts by 
April 2001 (Appendix 2.A1). The program was implemented by the government with support 
primarily from UNICEF and USAID.  
The key vehicles of this program were the Female Community Health Volunteers 
(FCHVs). The FCHVs were trained to identify children in their communities; provide nutritional 
information to community members; and to mobilize local groups (such as mothers' groups and 
farmers groups) to encourage participation by communities. Currently, there are nearly 48,000 
FCHVs in the countries, performing tasks that range from raising awareness about preventive 
health to delivering basic healthcare functions (Andersen et al., 2013). 
The take-up rate was high. In the first year of implementation, 6,500 FCHVs provided 
vitamin A capsules to 470,000 children, representing 90 percent of the target population in eight 
districts. By 1995, 86% of all children below the age of five had received supplementation in 23 
districts. Seventy of the 75 districts were covered by 2001.  
 
2.3 Health Effects of Vitamin A Deficiency 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the primary result of vitamin A deficiency is blindness. If 
the human body lacks vitamin A in sufficient amount, a condition called xerophthamia or a 
dryness of eyes develops. This condition manifests first as night blindness and progresses into 
softening of the cornea and total blindness if the vitamin A deficiency continues. 
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More generally, vitamin A deficiency is associated with the weakening of the tissues and 
the immune system, both translating to greater risk of respiratory, measles and diarrheal 
morbidity, and subsequently mortality. In fact, vitamin A deficiency affects about 21% children 
below the age of 5 years in developing countries and leads to the deaths of over 800,000 women 
and children each year (West, 2002). Furthermore, vitamin A deficiency is responsible for 20–24 
percent of global child mortality from measles, diarrhea, and malaria and for 20 percent of all 
cause maternal mortality (Rice et al., 2004). It also increases the severity and fatality of measles 
(Sommer and West, 1996).  
The primary food sources of vitamin A are ripe yellow fruits; carrots, spinach and green 
leafy vegetables; and animal products such as eggs, milk and liver. Recognizing the critical role 
these food items play in strengthening body functions, the World Health Organization has 
included a separate category to reflect intake of these items in its Diet Diversity Index. In 
absence of sufficient vitamin A intake through these sources, children 6-11 months of age are 
recommended to receive an oral dose of 100,000 International Units (IU), and children 12–59 
months of age are recommended to receive a 200,000 IU dose every four to six months (Rose, 
2002). There are recommended doses for adults as well, but are not provided here since the focus 
of this paper are children. 
From this discussion, in addition to blindness and disability, ideal measures of health 
effects would also include respiratory, measles and diarrhea-related mortality specifically caused 
by vitamin A deficiency. However, such data are not available in the census, the primary source 
of data for this paper and discussed in the next section.  
 
2.4 Data  
The primary data source used in this paper is Nepal’s National Population and Housing 
Census 2011. Like many national censuses, this census collected information on demographics, 
education, housing, asset ownership and employment from all individuals living in the country at 
the time of the survey.    
A 15 percent sample of the census was obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics of 
Nepal. Of the 4,037,885 individuals included in the sample, information on the district of birth 
was missing for 127,456 individuals. These individuals were dropped because without 
information on the district of birth, it was not possible determine whether they were exposed to 
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the program or, if they were, the timing of the exposure. Another 6,597 individuals were dropped 
because they were foreign citizens. For the remaining 3,903,832 individuals, their birth year was 
calculated as the difference between 2011 and their current age, and their age at first exposure 
was calculated as the difference between the year when the program was rolled out in their 
district and the birth year. Children whose age at first exposure was less than five completed 
years are considered to be treated through the program.  
I limit the sample further in two other ways. First, I include only those individuals who 
were between 13 and 22 years of age in 2011. Everyone below 13 years in the sample was 
treated through the program, while everyone above 22 was not treated. In the remaining sample 
of 736,392 individuals, the age at exposure ranges from -4 to 13 years (i.e., those who were born 
four years after the program rollout to those who were already 13 years old at the time of the 
rollout). Second, when estimating equation (2), I limit the analysis to children who were already 
born at the time of the program rollout in their district. I do so because the program had a 
nutritional component through which mothers were encouraged to consume healthier food. Some 
of the long-term effect observed on the health of children who were not already born at the time 
of the program rollout can be through the health of the mother and not directly through the 
vitamin A supplementation administered to the child. To parse out the two effects (the effect 
through the mother’s health and the one directly through the vitamin A supplementation received 
by the child), it is important to limit the analysis to children who were already born and hence 
were not affected by mother’s diet.  Given that different samples are used for different outcomes, 
in Appendix Table 2.A1, I provide a table showing how the final sample of each outcome was 
derived.   
I look at blindness and disability as the primary intermediate outcomes as those are the 
health conditions that vitamin A directly influences. For each individual, the census asks the 
form of disability the individual has. Specifically, it asks “What the physical and mental 
disability of (name)?” and provides nine options, including ‘Not disabled’. For this paper, an 
individual is categorized as having vision disability if he or she indicated having “Blind/low 
vision”.  The individual is categorized as having a disability in general if he or she indicated 
having some form of disability, including “mentally disabled” or “speech problem.”  
For education outcomes, I look at whether the individual is currently in school. Here, the 
oldest individual is 22 years of age. Nepal does not have a culture of taking a year off after 
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completing high school (equivalent to sophomore year of high school in the United States). 
Individuals who do relatively well tend to continue their higher education without an 
interruption. If an individual starts formal schooling at age six and progresses through the 
education system without repeating a grade, the individual would still be at a university until age 
22. Therefore, being in school would reflect a positive effect of the program. 
One downside of the measure above is that individuals may remain in school simply 
because their performance was weak which made them repeat grades. In absence of a good 
measure for cognitive ability which the program may have potentially improved, I also examine 
the effect of the program on whether the individual is in a grade appropriate for his or her age. I 
do so for children who are in high school (grade 12) or lower.  I define the education-for-age (a 
binary variable) as one if the child has been in grade one by age six and did not repeat a class 
(that is, the child was at least in grade 2 by age 7, grade 3 by age 8, and so on). Finally, for those 
who left school, I look at the highest grade they completed before leaving.   
 
2.5 Identification Strategy 
In order to evaluate the long-term effects of exposure to the vitamin A supplementation 
program, I rely on a method similar to the one adapted by the vast number of studies that have 
evaluated the long-term effects of early-life exposure to different schooling environments—
starting with Duflo (2001). Specifically, I compare the long-term effects for children born in the 
same household around the time of the program rollout. As mentioned before, the program was 
rolled out across districts between 1993 and 2001, and children under five years were treated. 
Because of this arrangement, children born in the same household either benefited from the 
program or did not, depending on their year of birth and the timing of the program rollout in their 
district. Consider two children born, in 1991 and 1993, to a mother in Arghakhanchi district in 
the western part of the country. The program started in that district in October 1997. The child 
born in 1991 would be more than five years old in 1997, so would not benefit from the program. 
The other child, born in 1993, would be less than five and therefore would benefit from the 
program. In 2011, the child born in 1991 would be 20 years old while the one born in 1993 
would be 18. I compare the outcomes—as measured in 2011—for these two individuals. In 
econometrics terms, I utilize the within-household variation in exposure to the program and the 
 
43 
   
outcomes reported in 2011 to estimate the causal effect of the early-life vitamin A 
supplementation on long-term outcomes.  
Although one can generally assume that children born within the same household face 
similar external environments, such as parental care and health risks, there are two threats to 
identification one needs to address. The first is that, irrespective of the exposure to the program, 
girls might be treated differently than boys, which could lead to different long-term outcomes for 
men and women. The discrimination against girls in South-Asian societies and its implications 
for the girls’ health has been widely documented (e.g., Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). To 
account for such differences, I control for the gender of the child in all specifications. The second 
threat is that children born to the same household may be exposed to different external 
environments based on their year of birth. For example, parental employment status and incomes 
could change over time, possibly altering the time and money investments that they can make on 
their children. Macro-level changes, such as budget allocation to the health sector, could affect 
the type of health services the two children receive. To account for such differences, I control for 
the birth year of the child in all specifications.  The regression equation I estimate, then, is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡……….(1) 
In this equation, Yijt is the outcome measured in 2011 for a child i born to household j in 
year t. BelowFive is a binary variable which equals one if the child was less than five years old in 
the year the program was rolled out in his or her district. Male is a binary indicator for the gender 
of the child. In this equation, 𝜋1 is the key coefficient of interest and captures the relationship 
between child’s exposure to the program and his or her outcomes later in life (specifically in 
2011). The expected sign on 𝜋1 depends on the outcome. When the outcome is disability, for 
example, the expected sign is negative because we expect the program to reduce the probability 
of having a disability. 𝜃𝑗  captures the time-invariant characteristics of the household, while 𝜂𝑡 
captures effects specific to the child’s birth year. 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the usual error term, while 𝜋0 reflects the 
baseline outcome after accounting for gender, birth year and the household-specific factors. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  
Given the inclusion of gender and birth year in the regressions, the key identifying 
assumption is that, without exposure to the program, two children who are of the same gender 
and born in the same year within a household would have similar long-term outcomes. The 
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characteristics of the household faced by two children are more likely to vary when the window 
between births is wider. In robustness check, I conduct additional analysis by limiting the sample 
to children who are either four or six at the time of the program rollout in their districts, thus 
comparing long-term outcomes for children who were born very close apart.  
In order to evaluate the effect of the age at exposure to long-term outcomes, I estimate an 
equation similar to equation (1) above but instead of a binary variable BelowFive to represent 
treatment status, I include multiple indicators for the treated children. The equation I estimate is: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜋0 +  𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡……….(2) 
The notations in equation (2) are the same as in equation (1). The only difference 
between the two equations is that in equation (2), AgeAtExposure consists of several binary 
indicators representing the age at which the child was first exposed to the program. The 
indicators are ‘from birth to one year’, ‘one to two years’, ‘two to three years’, ‘three to four 
years’ and ‘four to five years’. All untreated children, i.e., those who were already more than five 
years old at the time of the program rollout in their district, are in the excluded group. Using the 
example from earlier, the child born in 1991 in Arghakhanchi district would be in the excluded 
group because he or she would be six years old in 1997, while the child born in 1993 would be in 
the ‘between four to five years’ category. The identifying assumption here is that, after 
controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the household, birth year and the gender of the 
child, two children within a household differ only in terms of when they were exposed to the 
program and the difference in outcomes is only due to this difference in the timing of the 
exposure.  
 To evaluate the heterogeneous effect of the program by gender and ethnicity, I estimate 
equation (1) separately for men and women, and for individuals from advantaged and 
disadvantaged ethnic groups. The Nepalese government has categorized the country’s more than 
100 ethnicities into six main categories based on religion, caste and ethnicity, and further into 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups based on historical access to resources. In this study, I use 




   
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Main Results 
The program had large, discernible effects on long-term health and education outcomes. 
Children who were exposed to the program in childhood were 0.05 percentage points less likely 
to be suffering from blindness in adulthood (Table 2). While this effect is only marginally 
significant, it represents a decrease in blindness by approximately 25 percent from the mean 
(=100*0.0005/0.002). Likewise, the program reduced disability in adulthood by approximately 
14.5 percent from the mean (=100*0.0019/0.013). This effect on disability is statistically 
significant even at the one percent level. Note that these effects, as well as the effects discussed 
in the rest of the paper, are closer to being treatment-on-the-treated effects, rather than intent-to-
treat ones, because of the high uptake of the program.  
Given the reduced chances of being blind or disabled, it is not surprising that the children 
who benefited from the program were also more likely to be in school in 2011 than those who 
did not benefit. Based on Table 2.2, treated children were 0.41 percentage points (statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level) more likely to be in school at the time of the survey. In the 
sample, 64 percent of individuals were in school at the time of the survey. The program 
increased that rate by 0.6 percent. In the sample, approximately 25 percent children below the 
age of 19 are in a grade appropriate for their age. The program increased this rate by 1.5 
percentage points, or approximately six percent of the mean (=100*1.3/25). The program, 
however, was inadequate to influence education attainment as measured by the highest level 
completed for the sample of individuals who had already left school. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that improved health—as measured by reduced probabilities of having 
blindness or a disability—also improves labor market prospects. In other words, some children 
may have left school to go to work. The data do not allow for a formal test of this explanation, 
however. 
Children who were exposed to the program were more likely to be married in 2011 than 
those who were not. On average, the program increased the probability of being married by their 
age in 2011 by 2.1 percentage points (statistically significant at one percent level). In the sample, 
23 percent individuals are married, which implies that the program increased marriage rate by 
approximately nine percent relative to the mean. Among those who were married, however, the 
program had had no effect on the age at which they got married.  
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2.6.2 Effect of the Duration of Exposure 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the goals of this paper is to examine the effect of 
the duration of exposure to the program on long-term outcomes. Relative to the untreated 
children, the timing of the exposure does not seem to affect the health-related outcomes, except 
marginally the disability status when the child was exposed to the program for either two or three 
years (Table 2.3).  
However, the effects are visible on other outcomes—shown more clearly by the marginal 
effects’ plots in Figure 2.1. Relative to the untreated group, the program improved the 
probability of staying in school when the child was exposed for three years and marginally when 
the child was exposed for all four years. The effect on meeting the education-for-age requirement 
is almost linear; the higher the duration of exposure to the program, the higher the probability of 
meeting the education-for-age requirement. Marriage prospects seem to change in the opposite 
direction. Relative to the untreated children, children who were exposed to the program for one 
year were more likely to be married by 2011 but the magnitude of the effect gradually falls with 
the duration of the exposure. By the time the children are exposed for four years, they end up 
having a lower chance of being married than the untreated children. This trend is consistent with 
the effect seen on the age at marriage for the sample of children who are already married. 
Relative to the untreated children, the age at first marriage is lower for treated children but the 
difference falls gradually with the duration of exposure; by the time the child is exposed for four 
years, he or she is likely to get married later than an untreated child.  
 
2.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Gender and Ethnicity  
Between men and women, the primary difference in long-term effects is in the probability 
of having a disability and the probability of staying in school (Table 2.4, panel A). The program 
did not reduce the probability of being disabled for women while the effect was substantively 
large and statistically significant for men. Specifically, for men, the program reduced the chances 
of being disabled in the long term by 0.3 percentage points at a base of about 1.3 percent (thus a 
reduction of almost 25 percent). It did not help men stay in school until the time of the census, 
however. In contrast, for women, the program increased the chances of staying in school by 0.7 
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percentage points at a base of about 64 percent (thus an increase of about one percent). For other 
outcomes, the program’s effects were in the same direction for men and women.  
The program also had different effects on individuals from advantaged and disadvantaged 
ethnic groups (Table 2.4, panel B). It reduced the probability of having a blindness for 
advantaged groups but not for disadvantaged groups. Specifically, for the advantaged groups, it 
reduced the probability by about 0.1 percentage point at a base of 0.2 percent (thus a reduction of 
about 45 percent). This effect is statistically significant at the five percent level. The program 
helped individuals from disadvantaged groups stay in school at the time of the census but not for 
the advantaged groups. The effect on the disadvantaged groups was 2.3 percentage points at a 
base of 64 percent (thus an improvement of about 3.5 percent. This effect is statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Similarly, the program helped individuals from 
disadvantaged groups to meet the education-for-age requirement, raising it by 1.2 percentage 
points or by about 5 percent from the mean of 25 percent.  
By improving the probability of staying in school and meeting the education-for-age 
requirement for individuals in the disadvantaged group, the program also seems to have 
improved marriage prospects. Treated individuals from disadvantaged groups were more likely 
to be married at the time of the survey compared to the untreated individuals from the same 
group. The program had an opposite effect on individuals from the advantaged group. In this 
group, the treated individuals were less likely to be married—and those who were married had 
been married a year later—than untreated individuals.  
The takeaway from the sub-group analysis by gender and ethnicity is that the program 
had different long-term effects based on individual’s gender and status in the society. Health 
effects were clearly more pronounced for men and the advantaged ethnic groups. Education 
benefits were better for women and the disadvantaged ethnic groups. Marriage prospects 
improved as a result of the program for both men and women, although by different magnitude. 
There is also suggestive evidence that, for those who were already married, the age at first 
marriage was lower for treated men and women than those who were untreated. The difference in 




   
2.7 Validity Check 
One can raise a number of concerns about the validity of the main results discussed in the 
previous sections. The first concern can be that, although I estimate the effects using the district 
of birth, households might have migrated after the children were born, which can potentially 
affect the outcomes for younger (thus treated) and older (thus not treated) children differently. 
To address this concern, I estimated equation (1) using the sample of individuals who are 
currently living in the same district as the ones in which they were born. The overall effects 
remain largely unchanged (Table 2.5).  
In addition, the chances of two children within the same household having different 
treatment status solely due to migration of the household are relatively low. Among those who 
migrated, 69 percent individuals moved to a district where the program was rolled out later than 
in their district of birth. Take a household with two children, a four year old and a six year old, 
living in a district where the program has not been rolled out. If the household migrated between 
the two births, the probability of them moving to a district where the program was already in 
place and, as a result, exposing the four year old to the program is only 31 percent. The 
probability of them moving to a district where the program was rolled out later—thus not 
exposing either of the children to the program—is 69 percent.  
A second concern is selection. If the program helped reduce mortality, the marginal 
children saved might be less healthy. If this happened, in the treatment group, we would end up 
with a greater proportion of children who have a low vision or are disabled than we would 
without the program. In that case, our estimated effect would be lower than the actual effect. 
This is an important concern because the program has been found to reduce mortality 
substantially in the near-term (Thapa, Choe, and Retherford, 2005).  
To assess the extent of this problem when evaluating long-term effects, I estimate the 
relationship between the size of the cohort and exposure to the program. More specifically, I 
estimate the following equation:  
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑎𝑗 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡……….(3) 
In equation (3), the outcome is the natural log of the total number of individuals of age a 
born in district j who have survived until the time of the survey (i.e., 2011). Treatment is a binary 
variable which equals one if a certain age group in district j was exposed to the program in the 
district (therefore, it varies by age and by district). District fixed effects 𝜃𝑗  control for time-
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invariant district characteristics that affect mortality, while birth year fixed effects 𝜂𝑡  control for 
district-invariant year-specific factors. The standard errors are clustered at the district level to 
allow arbitrary correlation between observations within a district.  
Cohort size, measured as the total number of a certain age who are currently living, is a 
measure of survival or cumulative mortality (Jayachandran, 2009; Miller and Urdinola, 2010). 
To calculate the cohort size here, the population at each age group (at annual intervals) was 
aggregated to the district level. Individuals born between 1989 and 1997 (the same group of 
individuals as those in the analytic sample for the main analysis) are included. Data on nine age 
groups in 75 districts yields a sample of 675 observations, which is the effective sample size for 
estimating equation (3). 
The coefficient of interest (π1 in equation (3)) is -0.04 and statistically significant at the 
five percent significance level (not shown in a separate table). The coefficient implies that the 
population of the treated cohorts was four percent lower than the population of the untreated 
cohort [=100-(100*exp(0.04))]. As shown by the plots shown in Figure 2.2, which were 
generated from the regression equation, the cohort size was lower for the treatment group than 
for the untreated group at each birth year. At least in the long-term, therefore, the effects 
discussed in the main section are not due to selection on mortality; if anything, long-term 
mortality in the sample has risen (by a statistically significant amount of approximately four 
percent).  
 
2.8 Caveats and Conclusion 
In this paper, I evaluated the long-term effect of a vitamin A supplementation program in 
Nepal on primarily health and education outcomes. Although the program’s effects varied by the 
timing of exposure, by gender and ethnicity of the individual, in general it had positive effects on 
the health and education outcomes.  
The findings presented here should be understood in light of a number of caveats, 
however. First, the two intermediate health outcomes evaluated here – poor vision and disability 
– and the educational outcomes are only a few of the many components of individuals’ 
wellbeing. Evaluation of the program using a more exhaustive list of outcomes was not possible 
given the limited data that census collects. It was not possible to replicate the same analysis 
using other sources from Nepal, including the 2011 Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS). 
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Although the NLSS collects information on a wide range of indicators, including disability, 
overall health and employment status, the sample size (6,000 households) is much lower than 
what would be required to detect an effect on these outcomes. It would also be difficult to 
identify individuals’ exposure to the program using the NLSS because the information on the 
district of birth is not available. A natural next step, therefore, is to conduct a similar analysis 
with different outcomes, including income and employment (which are not evaluated here 
because the adults are still young to be employed), once the next round of the census becomes 
available.  
Second, the identification strategy relies on the assumption that a household—and 
multiple children born into it over time—face similar external environments over time, which 
may not always be true. One possible threat to this identification originates in the predominantly 
agrarian nature of the Nepalese economy.  Nearly 70 percent of Nepal’s population is employed 
in agriculture which contributes 34 percent to the Gross Domestic Product (International Labor 
Organization, 2016). Households rely heavily on rainfall for irrigation. Fluctuations in rainfall 
and the resulting variation in food availability can easily alter a household’s investments on 
children’s health depending on when they are born. Maccini and Yang (2009) examine the 
impact of early-life rainfall on a range of adult outcomes in Indonesia and find that higher early-
life rainfall leads to improved health, schooling and socioeconomic status for women. In the 
current study, if different children within a household are exposed to different rain-fall shocks, 
their long-term education and health outcomes might differ, irrespective of their exposure to the 
vitamin A program. Birth year fixed effects should capture some of this effect. Nonetheless, 
subsequent further analysis can be strengthened by controlling for weather (mainly, rainfall and 
temperature around the time of birth) and crop output as well.  
Finally, although the data are nationally representative, one will need to be cautious when 
extrapolating the findings to other countries, especially ones with a much lower prevalence of 
disability, vision problems and higher educational status. It is also important to recognize that the 
effect of the program is estimated off of the households where there are at least two children—
with one exposed to the program and the other not exposed to it. In this study, 25.2 percent of 
households meet that requirement. The program’s effect is essentially driven by the health and 
education outcomes of children in these households, although there is no strong reason to believe 
that these households are different than the overall national sample to threaten external validity.  
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Despite these limitations, this study has generated important insights on the intermediate 
health outcomes through which an early-life intervention can affect other outcomes. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate the long-term effects of an early-life intervention 
from Nepal in a way that allows for a causal interpretation of the estimated effects (under certain 
assumptions discussed in Section 3.5). By evaluating the program’s effects of health outcomes 
that are directly related to the intervention (here, blindness and disability), I have established that 
one primary channel through which nutritional interventions affect educational outcomes is 
health. I have also shown that long-term effects can be different for different segments of the 
population. Strikingly, other studies have found that coverage rates of the program are similar for 
boys and girls (Thapa, 2010). This implies that long-run effects can be different even when boys 
and girls are equally likely to be treated.  When designing new programs, differential effects the 
program can have on long-term outcomes to different segments of the population is an important 
consideration the policymakers should keep in mind.  I am unaware of any study that has 
evaluated differences in long-term outcomes by ethnicity. The findings from this paper suggest 
that the effects—even on outcomes like blindness which the program directly catered to—varied 
by ethnic status.  
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for the Overall Sample 
 N Mean SD 
Has a blindness 716,283 0.002 0.045 
Has a disability 724,406 0.013 0.114 
Currently in school 708,075 0.64 0.48 
Meeting education-for-age requirement 443,724 0.25 0.43 
Highest grade completed before leaving school 182,486 7.6 3.0 
Married 733,586 0.23 0.42 
Age at first marriage 170,094 17.2 2.3 
Gender (male = 1) 733,586 0.48 0.50 
From advantaged ethnic group 730,386 0.39 0.49 
        









   
Table 2.2. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Exposure 
to the Program on Outcomes 
 
 Blindness Disability    
Treatment -0.0005* -0.0019***   
 (0.0003) (0.0007)   
     
N 716,283 724,406   
R-squared 0.0001 0.0006   
F statistic 2.8  17.4    







Treatment 0.0041* 0.0150*** 0.0483  
 (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0340)  
     
N 708,075 443,724 182,486  
R-squared 0.20 0.18 0.05  
F statistic 5,951  2,796  186   
     
 




Treatment 0.0213*** 0.0131   
 (0.0019) (0.0212)   
     
N 733,586 170,094   
R-squared 0.25 0.55   
F statistic 6,422  6,277    
         
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  





   
 
 
Table 2.3. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Age at Exposure on Health Outcomes 
 




Married Age at 
marriage 
Exposed for one year 0.0000 0.0004 0.0013 0.0080** 0.0216*** -0.0841*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0199) 
       
Exposed for two years -0.0004 -0.0015* -0.0020 0.0091** 0.0146*** -0.0678*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0214) 
       
Exposed for three years -0.0005 -0.0015* 0.0080*** 0.0092** 0.0095*** -0.0576** 
 (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0023) (0.0227) 
       
Exposed for four years -0.0005 -0.0016 0.0066* 0.0121** -0.0118*** 0.0514* 
 (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0276) 
       
Constant 0.0023*** 0.0107*** 0.8395*** 0.3834*** 0.5908*** 18.1162*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0186) 
       
N 570,611 577,228 563,292 331,457 583,970 162,306 
R-squared 0.0001 0.0008 0.1704 0.1952 0.2119 0.5378 
F statistic 2.0 12.6 2689.6 1560.9 2993.2 4459.2 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level     
Comparison group are children who were not exposed to the program because of their age  





   
Table 2.4. Heterogeneous Effects of the Exposure to the Program, by Gender and Ethnicity 
 






Married Age at 
marriage 
A. By ethnicity        
Advantaged groups -0.0009** -0.0021* 0.0003 0.0009 0.0376 -0.0111*** 0.0974** 
 (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0621) (0.0028) (0.0389) 
N 275,951 279,306 274,297 199,622 60,551 282,268 51,962 
        
Disadvantaged groups -0.0002 -0.0015* 0.0231*** 0.0120*** 0.0668 0.0259*** 0.0177 
 (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0414) (0.0025) (0.0261) 
N 437,226 441,969 430,773 242,568 121,059 448,118 117,335 
B. By gender        
Men -0.0005 -0.0033** 0.0058 0.0282*** 0.0901 0.0175*** -0.0117 
 (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0639) (0.0033) (0.1257) 
N 342,630 347,239 340,297 227,837 86,906 351,648 45,791 
        
Women -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0073* 0.0138** 0.0336 0.0346*** -0.0320 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0756) (0.0040) (0.0653) 
N 373,655 377,172 367,795 215,853 95,596 381,938 124,406 
        
Overall mean 0.002 0.013 0.64 0.25 7.6 0.23 17.2 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01       
Each coefficient shown above is from a separate regression.  
Standard errors are clustered at the household level     






   
 
Table 2.5. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Exposure to 
the Program on Outcomes for the Non-migrating Sample of the 
Population 
 Blindness Disability   
Treatment -0.0004 -0.0021***  
 (0.0003) (0.0008)  
    
N 633,105 640,684  
R-squared 0.0001 0.0006  
F statistic 2.0  14.5   




Education-for-age Grades completed 
Treatment 0.0084*** 0.0128*** 0.0414 
 (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0387) 
    
N 626,320 395,877 154,729 
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.05 
F statistic 5470  2188  166  
    
 
Married Age at first 
marriage 
 
Treatment 0.0225*** 0.0190  
 (0.0020) (0.0247)  
    
N 649,152 142,521  
R-squared 0.25 0.54  
F statistic 5504  4923   
        
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2.A1. Analytic Sample by Outcome   
 N 
Population of Nepal according to the 2011 census 26,494,504 
     15 percent sample 4,037,885 
          Non-missing information on district of birth 3,910,420 
               Nepalese citizens 3,903,832 
                    Between 14 and 22 years of age in 2011 733,586 
                       Non-missing information on blindness 716,283 
                       Non-missing information on disability 724,406 
                       Non-missing information on 'currently in school'   708,075 
                       Under 19 & non-missing information on education-for-age 443,724 
                       Has left school & non-missing information on grades completed 182,486 
                       Non-missing information on marital status 733,586 
                                           If married, non-missing information on age at marriage   170,094 
    








Figure 2.A1. Map Showing the Rollout of the Vitamin A Supplementation Program  
 
 









3 Effects of Nepal’s Community-Based Neonatal Care Intervention  
 
3.1 Introduction 
For every 1,000 children born, 48 die before their fifth birthday, the majority of them in 
developing countries (World Bank, 2013). Neonatal deaths—deaths which take place before a 
child reaches one month of age—make up about 40 percent of these deaths (You et al., 2010). In 
absolute terms, nearly four million neonates die every year worldwide (Lawn, Cousens and 
Zupan, 2005; Lawn et al., 2009). Almost all neonatal deaths take place in low- and middle-
income countries, with Africa and Southeast Asia accounting for two-thirds of these deaths 
(Lawn, Cousens and Zupan, 2005). The primary causes of neonatal death are preterm birth, 
severe infections and asphyxia, which together account for more than 85% of all neonatal deaths 
(Lawn, Cousens and Zupan, 2005). In Nepal, which is the focus of this paper, nearly 35,000 
children die before their fifth birthday each year, with two-thirds of these deaths occurring in the 
first month of their life (Pradhan et al., 2012). The national under-5 mortality rate stands at 54 
per 1,000, which makes Nepal one of the least safe places to be born.  
Globally, access to skilled delivery care is important for improving newborn survival 
(Ngoc et al., 2006). Maternal risk factors such as anemia and hypertension, and delivery 
complications such as prolonged or obstructed labor, are associated with a higher risk of neonatal 
mortality (Chalumeau et al., 2000), as they also increase the likelihood of preterm birth, 
infections and asphyxia. Not surprisingly, current global health efforts to reduce mortality are 
focused on increasing access to, and utilization of, maternal health care services during 
pregnancy and delivery (Lawn et al., 2009). 
This paper evaluates one such effort: the Community-based Neonatal Care Package 




interventions, such as the provision of a clean kit to be used at the time of delivery at home and 
the management of newborns’ health. Nepal is one of the first countries in South Asia to pilot 
such a comprehensive strategy to reduce neonatal death at the national level (KC et al., 2011), 
although  Similar interventions have been piloted in India (e.g., Tripathy et al., 2010) and 
Bangladesh (e.g., Baqui et al., 2008) at local levels. 
National-level evaluation of programs such as the CBNCP is often difficult. The 
programs may be piloted in the poorest districts for which it is difficult to find a reasonable 
counterfactual. The amount of resources required to collect program-specific nationally 
representative data may also be high. Not surprisingly, many of the evaluations so far are done 
on a small scale and test the effectiveness of specific component (such as an educational program 
or a financial incentive) within a small local area rather than that of the entire intervention, thus 
limiting the external validity of the findings.  
Against this background, this paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of 
community-based health interventions in multiple ways. First, I evaluate Nepal’s CBNCP using a 
sample that is similar to a nationally representative sample, thus obviating the need to justify the 
external validity of the findings. Second, I evaluate the program’s effect on intermediate 
outcomes in addition to neonatal mortality, thus shedding light on the pathways through which a 
program such as the CBNCP affects mortality. Finally, the method employed in this paper allows 
us to make a causal interpretation of the estimated effect.  
To preview the results, I find that the CBNCP had limited or no effect on neonatal 
mortality. This finding contradicts earlier claims of significant positive effects of the program on 
health behavior and outcomes (e.g., Pradhan et al. (2011)). In terms of the intermediate 
outcomes, there is no evidence that the program increased institutional deliveries or the skilled-
professional attended births. However, the program had significant effects on delivery practices 
at home, illustrated by the notable increase in the use of a clean kit, which was provided through 
the program. The program was also influential in changing health behavior of pregnant women 
such as encouraging them to visit health facilities for prenatal checkups. Similar effects are not 
seen in the uptake of iron pills, folic acid and tetanus shots—all of which depend on the quality 
of the providers, including availability of these drugs in local health facilities—suggesting that 






3.2 The Community-Based Neonatal Care Package 
The details of the CBNCP, including how it was conceived and brought into the national 
health agenda, have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Poudel et al., 2012; KC et al., 2011; 
Pradhan et al., 2012). Therefore, I only provide a summary here. The CBNCP evolved from an 
extensive consultation between Nepal’s government, development partners and the health 
community. The program’s primary goal was to reduce neonatal mortality through community-
based interventions. The government and three non-government organizations piloted the 
program in 10 districts across the country in 2009. It is not clear how the districts were chosen. 
As shown later, on average, the program districts are similar to the districts surrounding them. 
The program has seven components, ranging from broad, cross-cutting approaches such 
as communication for changing behavior to specific interventions such as the management of 
sepsis, which is the presence of bacteria and their toxins in the body due to infections of a 
wound. The seven components are: (i) behavior change and communication for newborns’ 
health, (ii) promotion of institutional delivery and clean delivery practices, (iii) postnatal follow 
up of neonates, (iv) community case management of neonatal infections, (v) management of low 
birth weight, (vi) prevention and management of hypothermia, and (vii) recognition and 
resuscitation of an asphyxiated (lacking sufficient oxygen) baby.  
The key vehicles of this program are the Female Community Health Volunteers 
(FCHVs). The government created the FCHVs in 1988 primarily to distribute vitamin A 
supplements and help reduce childhood pneumonia and diarrhea. They were subsequently 
instrumental in implementing the community-based Integrated Management of Childhood Illness 
program (Pradhan et al., 2012). With their pronounced success in delivering health services at 
the local level, they are often the first network on which the implementers tap. 
Under the CBNCP’s first three components, the FCHVs were trained to provide face-to-
face guidance to pregnant women about healthier delivery practices, to accompany them to a 
health facility for delivery and, if the delivery took place at home, attend to it along with a skilled 
birth attendant. The FCHVs were also trained to provide home-based postnatal care and to 
encourage women to visit health centers if necessary. Information on institutional delivery and 
clean delivery practices (if delivered a home) were also shared through local radios and social 




districts, Bardia. Under this component, the FCHVs were trained to identify infections, 
administer oral cotrimoxazole, which helps prevent infections, and refer the sick newborns to the 
health center for gentamicin injections, which reduce the spread of bacteria. Under the fifth 
component, the FCHVs were trained to identify cases of low birth weight among newborns using 
color-coded weighing scales and refer extreme cases to health centers. The key aspect of the 
sixth component was to encourage women to prevent hypothermia (low body temperature) 
through skin-to-skin contact between the mother and her baby. This approach has been used in 
other low-resource settings as an alternative to conventional neonatal care (McCall et al., 2010). 
The FCHVs were also trained to encourage immediate initiation of breastfeeding. Finally, under 
the seventh component, the FCHVs were trained to recognize asphyxia, perform step-by-step 
approach of initial stimulation suctioning and resuscitation using a bag-and-mask. Taken 
together, the CBNCP was expected to reduce mortality by identifying health problems early and 
by encouraging women to adopt safer delivery practices. By estimating the effect on mortality 
and on other intermediate outcomes, I evaluate the program on both types of results.   
 
3.3 Data 
I use data from the 2011 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) for the main 
analysis and also the 2006 NDHS in the robustness check. The NDHS is a nationally 
representative survey conducted approximately every five years. The NDHS collects detailed 
information from women between the ages of 15 and 49 years about their pregnancies and births 
within the five years preceding the survey date. In addition to detailed birth information, the 
NDHS also collects information on women’s characteristics including age, religion, highest level 
of schooling completed, and household attributes including access to electricity, source of 
drinking water, type of toilet facilities, and type of roofing and flooring materials. The NDHS 
provides a wealth index, calculated based on asset ownership using principal component 
analysis, and associated wealth quintiles. 
I evaluate the effect of the CBNCP on several outcome variables (Appendix Table 3.A1). 
Whether the child survived the first month of birth (neonatal mortality) is the primary outcome 
of interest for this paper. In the survey, for all births within the preceding five years (including 
still births), women were asked where the birth took place and if the child is alive. For children 




mortality—is the primary outcome because neonatal death more accurately reflects the quality of 
care received by the mother and the child during childbirth compared to under-5 mortality (Ngoc 
et al., 2006).  
Cases of abortion are dropped. They were distributed evenly between treatment and 
control districts before and after the program. Before the program started (average between 2006 
and 2008), 6.04% pregnancies in treatment districts and 6.82% pregnancies in control districts 
ended in abortion. After the program (average between 2009 and 2011), 2.52% and 3.46% 
pregnancies in treatment and control districts, respectively, ended in abortion. 
In exploring the intermediate outcomes, I look at the probability of institutional birth and, 
for births that take place at home, whether the birth was attended by a skilled professional. Both 
of these have been coded as binary variables. A birth that took place in a health center, hospital 
or a NGO facility has been counted as an institutional birth. Likewise, a birth is assumed to be 
professional-attended if a health professional (doctor, nurse or another person trained on birth) 
was present at the time of birth. In addition, I look at the use of a clean kit during delivery (if the 
delivery took place at home), prenatal and postnatal visits, and intake of iron and folic acid pills 
and tetanus shots. The program provided the kit to all pregnant women. For prenatal and 
postnatal visits, I construct binary variables equal to one if, respectively, the woman made four 
or more prenatal visits over the course of the pregnancy and went for postnatal checkup within 
two months of delivery. While two months is a long time after delivery to go for postnatal 
checkup by developed country standards—in developed countries, such as the United States, 
women usually go for a well-child visit within a week of birth—this is the only information 
available on postnatal checkup in the survey. For tetanus shots, the variable equals one if the 
woman took at least two tetanus shots during pregnancy. Two shots of tetanus during delivery, 
one month apart, are recommended by the World Health Organization for women who have had 
no prior tetanus shot (World Health Organization, 1999). 
The choice of the intermediate outcome variables is driven by the program goals and 
evidence in the literature on the variables’ association with child mortality. Access to skilled 
attendance at delivery is critical in reducing deaths that occur during pregnancy, delivery and the 
post-partum period (World Health Organization, 1999). On institutional delivery, a series of 
articles in the Lancet have argued in favor of adopting health center-based intrapartum care for 




women access to skilled service providers who are better able to diagnose and treat 
complications, thus reducing child mortality. In line with this argument, Maitra (2004) and Panis 
and Lillard (1994) find a strong effect of institutional delivery on child mortality in India and 
Malaysia, respectively. Beneficial effects of prenatal care on infant health outcomes have also 
been shown by Jewell (2007). I look at the use of a clean kit during delivery for births that take 
place at home because the kit was provided through the program to prevent infections during and 
immediately after birth. Finally, prenatal visits, postnatal visits and the intake of iron and folic 
acid pills and tetanus shots are standard prescriptions that international health community, 
including the WHO, has provided for better health of mothers and newborns.  
In the sample used for analysis, the neonatal mortality rate is 34 per 1,000 (Table 3.1).  
Note that the sample used in the analysis is not the entire NDHS sample. The choice of which 
observations to use was determined by the identification strategy discussed in Section 3.4. Only 
38% of births in the sample take place in health centers and 55% are attended by skilled 
professionals. Of the deliveries that take place at home, only 19% use a clean kit. Approximately 
55% of women make at least four prenatal visits to the health center and 50% make a postnatal 
visit within two months of delivery. Roughly 80% of women take folic acid/iron tablets during 
pregnancy (the survey does not ask for information on iron tablet and folic acid tablet intakes 
separately).  
In the sample, 47% of the children are boys. The average birth order is 2.6, close to 
Nepal’s fertility rate. Mother’s average education level is 3.5 years, which attests to the necessity 
of programs such as the CBNCP for communication and health behavior change in Nepal. 
Mother’s age at first birth is about 20 years. About 20% of the children are from households in 
urban areas, 46% have access to piped water, 67% to electricity and 46% to a toilet. 
Approximately 51% of children are from the poorest two quintile households based on the 
wealth index. Mothers of about 55% of children identify getting to the nearest health center, 
which on average is 55 minutes away from home, as a problem for them.  
 
3.4 Identification Strategy 
In evaluating the CBNCP, I capitalize on the fact that it was piloted in 10 districts in 
2009. The districts surrounding these 10 districts provide the counterfactual as the program was 




districts in which the CBNCP was not implemented in the control group so as to keep the control 
districts as similar as possible to the treatment districts. Instead, I only use the 44 districts 
surrounding the treatment districts as the control districts, as shown in Figure 3.1. Using the 
surrounding districts as control districts reduces the chance that treatment and control districts 
may be differentially exposed to another program or a different policy environment. The 
program districts are also more similar in terms of education, health and wealth to the 
surrounding districts than they are to all non-program districts (not shown here).  
In order to estimate the program’s effect, I employ a difference-in-difference strategy 
where the effect of the program is identified based on the pre-CBNCP and post-CBNCP 
differences in outcomes between treatment and control districts.   
For each of the outcomes discussed in Section 3.3, I estimate the following equation: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝜋2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋3[𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  ] +  𝜋4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡……….(1) 
In this equation, Outcomeijt is the outcome for a child i born in district j in year t, and Treat=1 if 
the CBNCP was piloted in district j in 2009 and 0 if it is a district surrounding one of the 
CBNCP pilot district. Post=1 for 2009 and after (2009, 2010 and 2011) and 0 for periods before 
2009 (2006, 2007 and 2008). Xijt includes child’s, mother’s, household’s and community’s 
characteristics that are different between the treatment and control districts at the time of the 
survey, and those that may have influenced the outcome. v is the disturbance term. The 
coefficient of interest is π3, which reflects the effect of the program, i.e., the difference in the 
outcome between treatment and control districts after the program relative to the difference in the 
outcome before the program. The expected sign of π3 depends on the outcome; for neonatal 
mortality, we expect a negative sign because the program should reduce such mortality. 
The key identifying assumption is that, without the CBNCP, the treatment and the control 
districts would have experienced similar changes in the outcomes. This holds if the treatment and 
control districts are similar in terms of the observable factors at baseline and if there are no 
differences in pre-program trends in the outcomes. These assumptions are discussed next.  
Before the CBNCP went into effect in 2009, the treatment and control districts are similar 
in the majority of the aspects (see Tables 3.2 for the covariates and Table 3.3 for the outcomes). 
However, there are statistically significant differences between the two categories of districts in 
terms of birth order of the child, urbanicity, access to water, access to electricity and the 




areas and have access to electricity. Urban households have fewer children than rural households 
which the lower birth order of a child in the treatment districts in the survey reflects. The 
treatment districts also have disproportionately more households in the richer wealth quintiles 
(quintiles 4 and 5). In contrast, a greater share of households in the control districts have access 
to water, which may be reflective of water shortages in urban areas.  
The treatment and control districts are also different in terms of the proportions of birth 
that take place in hospitals (institutional delivery) and the proportion of skilled professional-
attended births (Table 3.3). I assume that, after controlling for differences in the covariates, the 
treatment and the control districts are similar in terms of the outcomes. This assumption 
generally seems to hold as shown later by the statistically insignificant coefficient on Treat (π1).  
In order to check if there are different trends in neonatal mortality in treatment and 
control districts before the program went into effect, I conduct a formal test of the differential 
time trends in the analytical sample. More specifically, following Antwi, Moriya and Simon 
(2013), I estimate a regression of the key outcomes of interest on an interaction term between 
treatment and birth year for the years before 2009 and control for the set of covariates used in the 
subsequent analysis. A statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term would indicate 
that, conditional on the covariates, the trends in outcomes between treatment and control districts 
are different before the program. Appendix Table 3.A2 shows the coefficients from this analysis. 
The coefficients are all statistically insignificant at 5% level, implying that once I control for the 
covariates, the treatment and control districts can be assumed to have similar trends in outcomes 
before the program went into effect.      
The estimated effects should be interpreted as intent-to-treat estimates. The program was 
implemented throughout each pilot district, but there is no information on if, and the extent to 
which, the program reached all pregnant women in those districts.  
A brief note in the choice of covariates is in order. The covariates have been added 
mostly to account for differences between treatment and control districts prior to the program. 
However, a few covariates have been added in view of the effect they would have on the 
outcome of interest. For example, institutional deliveries have been found to be positively 
correlated with maternal schooling in other settings (Houweling et al., 2007).  Likewise, in India, 
women have been found more likely to give birth in a hospital when they are carrying a son than 




that women know the gender of the child before the child is born (probing into the child’s gender 
before delivery is illegal in Nepal). Ethnicity is also a strong determinant of health-seeking 
behavior in Nepal, with disparities across ethnicities in health outcomes widening in the recent 
decade (RTI International, 2008). Therefore, covariates such as mother’s education level, sex of 
the child and ethnicity are included even though there is no statistically significant difference 
between treatment and control districts in these variables before the program went into effect in 
2009. Inclusion of these covariates helps reduce the error term and improve the precision of the 
estimate of the program effect.  
The number of districts included in the analysis is lower than 50. Clustering the standard 
errors at the district level can accounts for the lack of independence between the observations in 
a given district. However, the statistical significance on the coefficient needs to be interpreted 
cautiously when the number of districts is lower than roughly 50 (Duflo, Glennerster and 
Kramer, 2006, p. 61). I address the small number of clusters (districts in this case) by reporting 
bootstrapped standard errors. In all estimation results, I report bootstrapped standard errors with 
1,000 iterations and seed 1. The standard errors are bootstrapped by district.  
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Impact of CBNCP  
In the main results tables (Tables 3.4 to 3.12), I show coefficients on the main effects and 
the interaction term (π1, π2 and π3) from a Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimated on equation 
(1). The first column reports the coefficients from the regression without any covariates. I then 
include child-related, mother-related, household-related and community-related covariates in a 
step-wise manner. Although the coefficient on the interaction term (π3) is identified in the first 
column itself, the step-wise addition of variables allows us to check the stability of the 
coefficient and, if the coefficient is stable, interpret the magnitude of the effect more confidently. 
Reassuringly, the coefficients are fairly stable in columns 1-5 in the majority of tables. For 
interpretation, I focus on column (5) since it fully controls for initial differences in the covariates 
between treatment and control districts. The coefficients should be read as the percentage point 
change from baseline given in Table 3.3.  
In all tables, the coefficients on the covariates (not shown) have the expected signs and 




children born to mothers who were older at their first birth and those born in larger households 
are less likely to die than their respective counterparts. Finally, children from richer households 
are less likely to die than those from poorer households. All of these findings agree with the 
NDHS final report (MOHP, 2012) which looks at simple correlations between several factors 
and under-5 mortality. 
Relative to the control districts, neonatal mortality in treatment districts decreased by 
about 1.4 percentage points due to the program, but the coefficient is not statistically significant 
at 5% (π3 in Table 3.4). The value of π1 is -0.01, meaning that controlling for the covariates, 
mortality in treatment districts was about 1 percentage point lower than in the control districts 
before the program started. The coefficient is not statistically significant at 5%. On average, 
neonatal mortality fell by about 0.5 percentage point after the program relative to before 
(coefficient on Post is -0.005). However, this improvement could be due to several other factors 
that changed during the period. The R-squared is low, at about 3%, even with all the covariates 
in the specification, meaning that only about 3% of the variation in mortality is captured by the 
covariates. Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide information on a few other factors critical 
to reducing mortality, such as food availability. 
Although the program’s effect on neonatal mortality was limited, it is possible that the 
program affected intermediate factors, such as institutional birth or prenatal behavior, which may 
be beneficial to mother and the child. I now proceed with an exploration of these intermediate 
outcomes.  
Looking at institutional birth, the first row of the first four columns of Table 3.5 reflects 
the pre-program difference in this variable between treatment and control districts. The 
difference disappears when we control for urbanicity—an aspect in which the treatment and 
control districts differ significantly based on Table 3.2. This provides us more confidence in the 
fully controlled specification (column 5). For all districts, on average, the institutional deliveries 
increased by as much as 14 percentage points during the period from the baseline of about 30%. 
The change is statistically significant. However, the effect of the program is small and 
statistically insignificant, as shown by the coefficient on the interaction term. The lack of the 
program’s effect on institutional birth may reflect the relative difficulty in taking women to 
hospital in Nepal’s difficult geographic terrain. In the analysis sample, about 55% women report 




irrespective of their current pregnancy status and would likely be higher if the question on 
difficulty in getting to the health center was asked at the time of delivery.  
The effect on professional-attended deliveries was also low and statistically insignificant 
(Table 3.6). The R-squared values in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are much larger than those in Table 3.4, 
potentially reflecting the direct effect that a program such as the CBNCP can have on promoting 
institutional delivery and professional-attended births—unlike in the case of mortality where 
additional events after birth may be influential (and thus a smaller share of variation in mortality 
is explained by the CBNCP compared to the variation in institutional or skilled professional-
attended delivery). 
One area in which the program had a significant effect (although only at 10% level) is the 
use of a clean kit during delivery for births that took place at home (Table 3.7). Evaluating the 
effect on the use of a clean kit is important because many newborns die due to infections around 
the time of birth and because a kit was provided to pregnant women through the CBNCP. 
Controlling for the covariates, there was no significant pre-program difference in the use of a 
clean kit between treatment and control districts. The use of a clean kit declined during the 
period. The decline is statistically significant at 5%, contradicts the improvement in general 
health behavior in Nepal during the period, and is an area for further research. The program’s net 
effect is evident in the coefficients in the third row, which shows that the program increased the 
use of a clean kit by about 9 percentage points relative to the overall decline (at the baseline of 
24%). However, the effect is statistically significant only at 10%.     
Encouraging prenatal visits by pregnant women was an integral part of the program. The 
program increased the percentage of pregnancies with at least four prenatal visits by about 9 
percentage points (Table 3.8) (mean at baseline = 49.5%). The effect is statistically significant at 
5%. There was a general rise in women’s visit to health care centers for prenatal visits during the 
period even without the program, as shown by the positive, statistically significant coefficient on 
post (row 2). On the other hand, the program did not increase post-delivery checkups within two 
months of birth (Table 3.9, row 3), although there was a significant rise in such check-ups 
generally during the period (Table 3.9, row 2). It is likely that the FCHVs were too focused on 





Although the program increased prenatal visits, there was no increase in the probability 
of taking folic acid or iron tablets during pregnancy (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). This lack of effect 
likely reflects supply-side constraints in Nepal’s health system, primarily the lack of medicines 
and regular operation of health centers in rural areas. Table 3.12, which shows that there was no 
increment in receiving tetanus vaccines—a WHO recommendation for all pregnant women who 
have not had tetanus shots before—also points to the supply side constraints as a possible barrier 
because of which the program’s overall effect was limited.   
 
3.5.2 Robustness check 
It is possible that the positive effect of the CBNCP observed above on the use of a clean 
kit and prenatal visits, and the lack of effect on other outcomes, is not due to the CBNCP but 
some other event occurring in the treatment districts. To determine this, I first perform the same 
analysis as above, but using the 2006 NDHS data under a hypothetical scenario that the CBNCP 
was implemented in 2004 in the same districts in which it was actually implemented in 2009.  I 
chose the year 2004 because it is the midpoint of the birth years in the 2006 NDHS (the survey 
covers children born between 2001 and 2006), just as 2009 is the midpoint of the birth years in 
the 2011 NDHS.   
My paper’s main findings contradict earlier studies which have found a significant effect 
of the program on mortality and many of the intermediate outcomes. Although these studies have 
looked at specific geographic areas and are mostly descriptive, it is important to address the 
contradictory findings. Therefore, I perform an additional test by evaluating the program’s effect 
on immediate nutritional outcomes. These are outcomes which the program was intended to 
influence only indirectly. If the nutritional status of mothers and children are similar between 
treatment and control districts before the program (including the trend), but changed afterwards, 
it raises concerns that the observed effect—both the significant effects on the use of a clean kit 
and prenatal checkups and the lack of effects on other outcomes— may also be due to other 
factors that may not have been fully captured in the estimation.  
Finally, as a robustness check on the choice of the LPM over a logistic or probit model, I 
run a logistic regression for key outcome variables using the same set of covariates as in column 





3.5.2.1 Effect assuming the program started in 2004 
The effect of the CBNCP observed in the use of a clean kit and prenatal visits in the 
2006-2011 sample is unlikely to occur by random chance or because of some underlying 
characteristic of the treatment districts. When using 2004 as the program year in the sample of 
children born between 2001 and 2006 (which the 2006 NDHS captures), the coefficient on the 
interaction term is statistically insignificant in all cases including in the specifications with use of 
a clean kit and prenatal visits as the outcomes (Table 3.13).  If the estimated effect earlier was 
due to some underlying characteristics of the program districts and not the program itself, the 
interaction term in Table 3.13 could have been statistically significant.  
 
3.5.2.2 Effect on nutritional outcomes 
If, contrary to this paper’s findings, the program did reduce child mortality, then one 
would expect children in the treatment districts to have poorer nutritional status than those in 
control districts. This is because the saved babies are most likely marginal babies who would 
have died in absence of the program. These babies are likely to be of poorer nutritional status. If 
more of these babies are saved in treatment districts than in control districts, then the overall 
nutritional status of children in treatment districts should fall relative those in control districts.  
For this argument to work, the nutritional status before the program should be similar as 
should the pre-program trends. The nutritional outcomes evaluated here include whether mother 
is anemic, whether child had low weight at birth, whether child is anemic, whether the child had 
diarrhea within two weeks prior to the survey, whether the child is underweight, and the z-score 
for the child’s weight-for-age. These are all short-term outcomes. Table 3.14 confirms that the 
nutritional outcomes are balanced before the program went into effect; the p-values of the 
difference between treatment and control districts’ means are all bigger than 0.05. Likewise, 
Appendix Table 3.A3 confirms that the trends in these outcomes are similar for treatment and 
control districts before the program. 
Information on nutritional outcomes is missing for a large portion of the sample. If 
individuals in treatment districts are more likely to have their nutrition information missing, or 
vice versa, our estimates can be biased. This may happen if, for example, children with low birth 
weight were consistently less likely to be weighed in control districts because of absence of the 




overestimate of the true effect. Therefore, I check if nutrition data are missing for different 
proportions of the sample in treatment and control districts. I do so by regressing missingness 
(=1 if information is missing) of each of the nutritional outcome variables, separately, on the 
treatment status. A statistically significant coefficient on the treatment status for a given outcome 
would indicate that the missing data are differential across treatment and control districts for that 
outcome. Table 3.15 shows that this is not the case. The reported coefficient on the CBNCP 
(treatment) on all of the nutritional outcomes is small and statistically insignificant.  
The coefficients on the interaction term (post*treatment) when nutritional indicators are 
used as outcomes are all small and statistically insignificant (Table 3.16). While this is not a 
conclusive falsification test (for the reasons provided in Section 3.6), it does provide additional 
evidence that the program’s effect on mortality may have been minimal.  
 
3.5.2.3 Results on the choice of specification  
In order to assess if the results discussed above are driven by the choice of the 
specification, I estimated equation (1) for all outcomes using logistic regression, instead of a 
linear probability model. I estimate the interaction effects using Ai and Norton (2003). The 
results (not shown here) confirm findings from the LPM: the program had a positive, significant 
effect on the use of a clean kit at the time of birth and a strong, positive effect on prenatal visits, 
and no effect on other outcomes.  
 
3.6 Conclusion, Caveats and Areas for Further Research 
In this paper, I evaluated a community-based neonatal intervention aimed at reducing 
neonatal mortality in Nepal. In contradiction to earlier studies that evaluated parts of this 
program in select geographic locations, I find that the program had limited effect on neonatal 
mortality, the primary outcome the program aimed to influence. In terms of the intermediate 
outcomes, there is no evidence that the program increased institutional deliveries or the skilled-
professional attended births. However, by providing a clean kit to be used at the time of delivery, 
the program encouraged cleaner delivery practices for births that took place at home. The 
program also encouraged pregnant women to go to the health facilities for prenatal checkups. 




The NDHS data do not allow us to explore why the use of a clean kit or an increase in 
prenatal visits did not translate to reduced mortality and why the program did not affect other 
intermediate outcomes significantly. Nonetheless, one can conjecture that the lack of effect on 
many of the outcomes reflect supply-side constraints, such as shortage of health workers and 
medicines, prevalent in the Nepali health system. It is possible, for example, that women visited 
health centers more often than before in response to the FCHVs’ persuasion, but when they went 
to the health centers, there may not have been anyone to administer tetanus shots. Likewise, 
pregnant women may be fully aware that it would be safer to deliver a baby in the hospital, but 
the time and monetary costs of going to the hospital at the time of delivery may be too high. The 
key weakness of the program was then the lack of sufficient strengthening of the health system 
commensurate with the rise in demand for services.     
The findings in this paper should be understood in light of a number of caveats. First, 
although I have used institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance as some of the 
intermediate outcomes through which the CBNCP may influence neonatal mortality, the causal 
link between institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance and mortality is still being 
debated in the literature. Walraven and Weeks (1999) argue that the skilled attendant in the local 
health facilities may be no more skilled than the traditional community midwife. Likewise, 
Harvey et al. (2007) find significant skill gaps in a study of skilled birth attendants in Benin, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Rwanda and Nicaragua. They find that knowledge of a procedure by health 
workers did not necessarily lead to the correct application of the procedure. If the FCHVs or 
local health workers were not trained adequately in the CBNCP, simply having them present at 
the time of delivery, or even taking women to health centers for delivery, may not help reduce 
mortality.  
Second, the baseline differences between treatment and control districts shown in Tables 
3.2, 3.3 and 3.17 are the differences for households and for women of children born before 2009 
reported in 2011 (the time of the survey). My identification strategy assumes that the differences 
in the covariates are time-invariant, and thus that the difference observed in 2011 for children 
born before 2009 is in fact the actual difference in 2009. If individuals in treatment and control 
districts have different recall bias, the baseline characteristics may be less similar than those 
reported here. For example, it is possible that women in treatment districts are more likely to 




such they might provide more accurate information than women in control districts. In that case, 
the identifying assumption is partly violated.  
Third, another program, called the Safe Delivery Incentive Program (SDIP), which was 
implemented throughout Nepal in 2009, may have interacted differently with treatment and 
control districts owing to initial differences in the distribution of wealth among households in the 
two categories of districts. On the one hand, the delivery and transportation incentives provided 
through the SDIP may affect poorer households (and hence control districts) more since those 
incentives constitute a higher share of their income. On the other hand, the incentives may be 
small enough to affect only the households with some level of existing resources. Such 
households may be more evenly distributed among control and treatment districts (Table 3.2 
shows that the treatment and control districts have a similar share of households in the third 
wealth quintile), thus there would be limited, if any, differential effect of the SDIP on treatment 
and control districts.  
The SDIP may have also altered incentive structures differently in treatment and control 
districts, mainly with respect to the decisions between institutional delivery and professional-
attended home delivery. The SDIP provided free delivery in hospitals and reimbursed a fixed 
amount (based on the region) to women to offset transportation costs if they delivered in 
hospitals. These incentives would encourage institutional deliveries. Incentives were given to the 
health workers through the CBNCP for each delivery they attended at home. These incentives 
would encourage home deliveries. While these two different and offsetting effects would be 
taking place in treatment districts, only the former effect would be taking place in control 
districts—thus affecting the two categories of districts differently. The net direction of the effect 
due to the interaction in treatment districts is an empirical question.  
Understanding of the interaction between the SDIP and the CBNCP in the CBNCP and 
the non-CBNCP districts can provide insights into the net effect of different types of incentives 
on health workers and households on promoting institutional delivery. From the side of the 
households alone, the CBNCP primarily provided information, while the SDIP is catered to 
providing subsidies. Further research could parse out these two effects, thus contributing to 
current literature on the role of information and subsidies on health products intake (see e.g. 




Finally, this paper assumes that there is no spillover of the program’s influence from 
treatment to control districts. There is no certainty that this assumption holds. In fact, in one 
intermediate outcome with significant effects—the use of a clean kit at the time of delivery—
there is limited scope for spillover (it is difficult to imagine a clean kit given to a household in a 
treatment district being passed to a household in a control district). Conversely, spillover is very 
possible in institutional delivery, since women are likely to go to the nearest hospital for delivery 
rather than a hospital in their own district if the latter is further.  
In order to ascertain findings from this paper, future research could also look at the 
interaction of the CBNCP with the SDIP and attempt to parse out spillover effects. Another 
potential research area is the degree to which the CBNCP may have crowded out other existing 
programs. An earlier evaluation of the program (Pradhan et al., 2012) has suggested that the 
quality of the FCHV’s work may have been compromised in some tasks due to their 
overstretched workload; a recent news report suggests that the FCHVs may have been involved 
in as many as 81 different activities (Setopati, 2014).  It is also possible that the FCHVs may 
have prioritized the CBNCP because of the incentive they received through the program and 
neglected other important national programs without similar incentives (Pradhan et al., 2011). If 
this is true, by introducing the CBNCP without due consideration of its implications for other 
programs, the government may have spent resources on a program that did not produce 
discernible results and adversely affected other programs. In general, supply constraints—in 
terms of human resources—are a major problem in Nepal’s health system. As such, any program 
that does not take into account the existing resource constraints during design and 
implementation is likely to crowd out other initiatives or simply fail. Such crowding out in this 
case would be particularly worrying given that the program does not seem to have significant 
positive effects even on reducing mortality, its primary goal. Therefore, a better understanding of 
the extent to which the CBNCP may crowd out other programs is crucial for future policy 
design.  
Further research can also be conducted on the potential heterogeneity of the treatment 
effect across districts. One of the reasons why the identification strategy in this paper works is 
that the districts selected for the program ranged from the poorest to some of the most well-off 
ones—thus making the district selection for the CBNCP fairly random (as the pre-program 




program districts in terms of wealth distribution, literacy and health indicators. It is possible that 
the effects reported in this paper are driven by effects in a few districts. Apart from initial 
differences in social and economic conditions across the treatment districts, heterogeneous 
effects could also originate from variation in implementation. The program was implemented by 
different agencies (Save the Children, CARE Nepal, Plan International and the Government of 
Nepal) in different districts, likely creating variation in reach and intensity of the program. The 
key local implementing agency was the District Public Health Office, whose capacity also varies 
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Tables and Figures  
  
Table 3.1. Summary statistics for the overall sample     
 N Mean SD 
Neonatal mortality 3305 0.034 0.182 
Institutional delivery (yes=1) 3305 0.384 0.486 
Skilled birth (for at-home births) (yes=1) 3305 0.546 0.498 
Clean kit used at delivery (yes=1) 1517 0.190 0.392 
Four antenatal visits (yes=1) 2557 0.544 0.498 
Postnatal within 2 months (yes=1) 2554 0.500 0.500 
Iron/folic acid in pregnancy (yes=1) 2556 0.805 0.396 
Iron/folic acid after delivery (yes=1) 2556 0.444 0.497 
Child's gender (male=1) 3305 0.473 0.499 
Month of birth 3305 6.489 3.316 
Twin (yes=1) 3305 0.013 0.115 
Birth order 3305 2.578 1.805 
Mother's education in years 3305 3.549 3.977 
Mother's age at first birth 3305 19.656 3.122 
Household size 3305 6.044 2.696 
Urban (yes=1) 3305 0.207 0.405 
Access to water (yes=1) 3305 0.458 0.498 
Access to electricity (yes=1) 3305 0.670 0.470 
Access to latrine (yes=1) 3305 0.544 0.498 
Wealth quintile 1 (poorest) 3305 0.313 0.464 
Wealth quintile 2 3305 0.208 0.406 
Wealth quintile 3 3305 0.178 0.382 
Wealth quintile 4 3305 0.156 0.363 
Wealth quintile 5 (wealthiest) 3305 0.145 0.352 
Problem getting to hospital (yes=1) 3305 0.552 0.497 
        












Table 3.2. Comparison of mean between treatment and control districts before CB-NCP 
 N Overall Control Treatment p-value 
Child's gender 1872 0.471 0.473 0.464 0.723 
(male=1)  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)  
Month of birth 1872 6.155 6.148 6.178 0.860 
  (3.19) (3.18) (3.21)  
Twin 1872 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.650 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)  
Birth order 1872 2.651 2.712 2.466 0.013 
  (1.85) (1.87) (1.78)  
Mother's education 1872 3.192 3.152 3.313 0.435 
  (3.86) (3.85) (3.89)  
Mother's age at first birth 1872 19.522 19.588 19.324 0.112 
  (3.11) (3.05) (3.27)  
Household size 1872 6.007 5.999 6.032 0.817 
  (2.71) (2.57) (3.11)  
Urban 1872 0.207 0.166 0.330 0.000 
  (0.41) (0.37) (0.47)  
Access to water 1872 0.459 0.511 0.303 0.000 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.46)  
Access to electricity 1872 0.670 0.652 0.723 0.005 
  (0.47) (0.48) (0.45)  
Access to latrine 1872 0.549 0.543 0.569 0.329 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)  
Wealth quintile 1 1872 0.322 0.344 0.255 0.000 
  (0.47) (0.48) (0.44)  
Wealth quintile 2 1872 0.207 0.222 0.163 0.007 
  (0.41) (0.42) (0.37)  
Wealth quintile 3 1872 0.173 0.164 0.197 0.101 
  (0.38) (0.37) (0.40)  
Wealth quintile 4 1872 0.148 0.132 0.197 0.001 
  (0.36) (0.34) (0.40)  
Wealth quintile 5 1872 0.150 0.138 0.187 0.011 
  (0.36) (0.35) (0.39)  
Problem getting to hospital 1872 0.555 0.565 0.524 0.115 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)  
            
      
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Ho: the means are not different. P < 0.05: reject null at 
5%. 






Table 3.3. Comparison of mean between treatment and control districts before CB-NCP 
 N Overall Control Treatment p-value 
Neonatal mortality 1872 0.050 0.051 0.047 0.732 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)  
Institutional delivery 1872 0.316 0.287 0.401 0.000 
  (0.46) (0.45) (0.49)  
Skilled birth (for at-home births) 1872 0.504 0.459 0.639 0.000 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)  
A clean kit used at delivery 784 0.217 0.211 0.240 0.423 
  (0.41) (0.41) (0.43)  
Four antenatal visits 1194 0.511 0.516 0.495 0.527 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)  
Postnatal within 2 months 1193 0.491 0.485 0.508 0.494 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)  
Iron/folic acid in pregnancy 1194 0.763 0.758 0.778 0.489 
  (0.43) (0.43) (0.42)  
Iron/folic acid after delivery 1193 0.397 0.391 0.418 0.412 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)  
            
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Ho: the means are not different. P < 0.05: reject null at 
5%. 





Table 3.4. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on Neonatal Mortality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
CBNCP -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
      
Post -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
      
Post*CBNCP -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
      
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.002 0.013 0.017 0.028 0.033 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 






Table 3.5. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on Institutional Birth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.114*** 0.095*** 0.102*** 0.051** 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) 
      
Post 0.167*** 0.152*** 0.117*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
      
Post*CBNCP -0.037 -0.016 -0.006 -0.018 -0.022 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.034 0.110 0.222 0.299 0.310 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 





Table 3.6. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on Professional-attended Birth (for 
deliveries that take place at home)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.150*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.025 0.055 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.037) 
      
Post -0.011 -0.014 -0.020 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
      
Post*CBNCP -0.051 -0.041 -0.039 -0.034 -0.044 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 2036 2036 2036 2036 2036 
R-squared 0.015 0.038 0.046 0.227 0.258 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 





Table 3.7. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on the Use of a Clean Kit during Delivery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.025 0.014 0.016 -0.008 0.038 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) 
      
Post -0.074*** -0.085*** -0.090*** -0.066*** -0.062*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
      
Post*CBNCP 0.088* 0.103** 0.106** 0.108** 0.091* 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 
R-squared 0.012 0.045 0.083 0.129 0.186 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 





Table 3.8. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on 'At Least Four Antenatal Visits' 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP -0.014 -0.028 -0.023 -0.035 -0.019 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) 
      
Post 0.202*** 0.189*** 0.155*** 0.178*** 0.175*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
      
Post*CBNCP 0.072* 0.091** 0.103*** 0.091** 0.094*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.050 0.096 0.192 0.239 0.251 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 






Table 3.9. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on 'Postnatal Visit within Two Weeks of 
Birth' 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.015 0.004 0.008 -0.002 0.050* 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) 
      
Post 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.122*** 0.146*** 0.141*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
Post*CBNCP 0.039 0.053 0.062* 0.050 0.053 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.031 0.057 0.115 0.166 0.182 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 















Table 3.10. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on the Use of Folic Acid before Delivery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.012 0.002 0.007 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) 
      
Post 0.307*** 0.297*** 0.274*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
      
Post*CBNCP 0.025 0.039 0.047 0.037 0.039 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.103 0.132 0.180 0.230 0.239 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 





Table 3.11. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on the Use of Folic Acid after Delivery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.017 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.038 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) 
      
Post 0.213*** 0.202*** 0.175*** 0.194*** 0.190*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
      
Post*CBNCP -0.022 -0.010 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.047 0.066 0.133 0.168 0.188 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 





Table 3.12. Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on Taking Tetanus Vaccine 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBNCP 0.034 0.024 0.027 -0.004 -0.016 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) 
      
Post 0.201*** 0.191*** 0.168*** 0.187*** 0.190*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
      
Post*CBNCP -0.015 0.000 0.008 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
      
Child's characteristics  x x x x 
Mother's characteristics   x x x 
Household characteristics    x x 
Fixed effects      
Birth year  x x x x 
Districts  x x x x 
      
N 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
R-squared 0.039 0.066 0.109 0.166 0.174 
            
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported.   
Child-related covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics 
include education and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to 
electricity, access to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and 





Table 3.13. CBNCP's Effects on Outcomes Assuming the Program Started in 2004 
 
Neonatal mortality Institutional birth 
Professional-
attended birth 
Use of clean kit 
during delivery 
     
CBNCP -0.003 0.013 0.048*** -0.027 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.017) (0.031) 
     
Post -0.010 0.037*** 0.013 -0.031* 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
     
Post*CBNCP -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 0.045 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.022) (0.036) 
     
N 3705 3705 2982 2105 
R-squared 0.059 0.269 0.137 0.114 
     
 At least four 
antenatal visits 
Post-natal visit 
within two weeks 
Took tetanus 
vaccines 
Took folic acid/iron 
during pregnancy 
     
CBNCP -0.022 -0.055** -0.088*** -0.064* 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) 
     
Post 0.02 -0.005 0.007 0.079*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
     
Post*CBNCP 0.017 0.023 0.041 0.033 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.041) (0.040) 
     
N 2671 2152 2670 2671 
R-squared 0.291 0.084 0.222 0.266 
          
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1, by district) are reported. 
All individual, parental, household and community controls are included in all specifications. Child-related 
covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics include education 
and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to electricity, access 
to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and whether the 






      
Table 3.14. Comparison of Mean between Treatment and Control Districts before CB-NCP, for 
Nutritional Indicators 
 N Overall Control Treatment p-value 
Mother is anemic 897 0.319 0.308 0.351 0.230 
  (0.466) (0.462) (0.478)  
Low birth weight (child) 588 0.143 0.133 0.165 0.296 
  (0.350) (0.339) (0.372)  
Child is anemic 832 0.349 0.358 0.322 0.353 
  (0.477) (0.480) (0.469)  
Child had diarrhea in past two weeks 1765 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.965 
  (0.267) (0.267) (0.266)  
Child underweight 836 0.318 0.311 0.339 0.434 
  (0.466) (0.463) (0.475)  
Child weight-for-age 836 -1.583 -1.588 -1.570 0.821 
  (1.000) (0.976) (1.067)  
            
      






















       
CBNCP 0.058 0.015 -0.023 -0.005 0.005 0.054 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.041) (0.016) (0.042) (0.138) 
       
N 1558 1247 1327 3146 1467 1467 
R-squared 0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
              
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
       
Table 3.16.   Linear Probability Model Results for the Effect of Treatment on Short-term Nutritional Outcomes 














       
CBNCP -0.072 -0.013 -0.107** 0.000 0.040 0.000 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.046) (0.020) (0.048) (0.107) 
       
Post 0.049* -0.014 0.301*** 0.131*** -0.017 0.196*** 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.031) (0.015) (0.027) (0.062) 
       
Post*CBNCP 0.050 -0.022 0.037 -0.007 -0.085 0.146 
 (0.058) (0.042) (0.063) (0.030) (0.052) (0.121) 
       
N 1558 1247 1327 3146 1467 1467 
R-squared 0.084 0.086 0.161 0.060 0.109 0.192 
              
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1) are reported.   
All individual, parental, household and community controls are included in all specifications. Child-related 
covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics include education 
and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to electricity, access 
to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and whether the 







Table 3.A1. Construction of Key Outcome Variables 
Name Nature Description 
Under-5 mortality  Binary =1 if the child is dead at the time of the survey, 0 otherwise. 
In the overall sample, there are 3,691 children of which 165 
died before the age of 5. 3691 matches with the number of 
observations in Table 4.  
Neonatal mortality  Binary =1 if the child is dead at the time of the survey and was less 
than or equal to one month old at the time of death, 0 
otherwise. In the overall sample, there are 3,691 children of 
which 123 died within the first month of birth. 
Institutional delivery Binary =1 if the delivery took place in place other than home. In the 
survey, respondents were asked where a child was born and 
given 13 options. Two referred to “respondent’s home” and 
“other home”. These are coded as 0. Other options have been 
coded as 1. Out of the 3,691 children in the overall sample, 
1,469 were born in the hospital while the remaining 2,222 
were not. 2,222 matches with the number of observations in 
Table 6 in which the analysis is done on the sample of 
children who were delivered at home.  
Skilled birth attendance Binary =1 if the respondents received help from a trained 
professional (doctor, nurse, health attendant, FCHV) other 
than her relative or friend, 0 otherwise. In the survey, 
respondents were asked who, if anyone, provided assistance 
during birth of her child. Out of the 2,222 children who were 
born at home, 638 were attended by a skilled professional.  
Clean kit used during 
delivery 
Binary =1 if the birth took place at home and a clean kit was used at 
the time of delivery, 0 otherwise. In the survey, the 
respondents were asked if a clean kit was used during 
delivery. Of the 2,222 births that took place at home, 321 
were reported to have used the clean kit, 1,305 were reported 
to have not used it, while 596 have missing information.  
At least four antenatal 
visits 
Binary =1 if the mother of the child went for at least four antenatal 
visits. Of 3,691 children in the overall sample, mothers of 
1,599 went for at least four antenatal visits, 1,279 did not and 
813 had missing information.  
Postnatal visit within 
two months 
Binary =1 if the mother of the child went for a postnatal checkup 
within two months of birth. Of 3,691 children in the overall 
sample, mothers of 1,469 went for postnatal checkup within 
two months of birth, while mothers of 1,406 did not. 
Information is missing for mothers of 816 children.  
At least two tetanus 
shots 
Binary =1 if the mother of the child took at least two tetanus shots 
during pregnancy. The survey asks the respondents if, and 
how many, tetanus shots they took during pregnancy. In the 
sample, mothers of 1,989 children took two or more shots, 
mothers of 882 did not, and information is missing for 




Took iron/folic acid 
during pregnancy 
Binary =1 if the mother of the child took iron/folic acid during 
pregnancy. In the sample, mothers of 2,337 children reported 
taking iron/folic acid pills during pregnancy, 540 reported not 
taking them and information is missing for 814. 
Took iron/folic acid 
after delivery 
Binary =1 if the mother of the child took iron/folic acid after the 
child was born. In the sample, mothers of 1,294 children 
reported taking iron/folic acid pills after delivery, 1,583 
reported not taking them and information is missing for 814. 
Low birth weight (all 
children) 
Binary =1 if the birth weight was less than 2,490 gram. 2,246 
children in the sample had missing data. This is about 60% of 
the total sample. Of those whose information on birth weight 
was not missing, 1,252 were underweight, while 193 (13% of 
those who were measured) were not.  
Mother is anemic Binary =if mother’s anemia status has been categorized as ‘severe’, 
‘moderate’ or ‘mild’ and 0 otherwise. In the overall NDHS 
sample, of those whose anemia status was measured, about 
65% women are not anemic, rest are.  
Child is anemic Binary =if the child’s anemia status has been categorized as ‘severe’, 
‘moderate’ or ‘mild’ and 0 otherwise. In the overall NDHS 
sample, of those whose anemia status was measured, about 
52% children are not anemic, rest are. 
Child had diarrhea in 
the past two weeks 
Binary =1 if the child was reported to have diarrhea during the two 
weeks preceding the survey. Approximately 14% children in 
the overall sample have had diarrhea during the two weeks 
preceding the survey. 
Child is underweight Binary =1 if the child’s weight is two or more standard deviation 
lower than the weight of a child of the same age in the 
reference population (provided by WHO). This is calculated 
based on the weight-for-age z-scores.  








Table 3.A2. Results from regressing outcomes on an interaction of treatment and birth year to check the parallel 
trend assumption 
 Neonatal 
mortality Institutional birth 
Professional-
attended birth 
Use of clean kit 
during delivery 
Treatment*birth year 0.00000 0.00000 0.00003 0.00003 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
     
N 2496 2496 1638 1086 
R-squared 0.039 0.296 0.260 0.193 
 At least four 
antenatal visits 
Post-natal visit 






Treatment*birth year -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00003* -0.00002 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
     
N 1755 1753 1751 1755 
R-squared 0.256 0.178 0.200 0.220 
          
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1) are reported. 
All individual, parental, household and community characteristics are included in all specifications.  Child-related 
covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics include education 
and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to electricity, access 
to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and whether the 














       
Table 3.A3. Results from Regressing Nutritional Outcomes on an Interaction of Treatment and Birth Year to 














       
Treatment*birthyear -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00008*** 0.00000 0.00003 -0.00004 
 (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00005) 
       
N 897 588 832 1765 836 836 
R-squared 0.076 0.137 0.110 0.032 0.106 0.162 
              
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 reps and seed 1) are reported.   
All individual, parental, household and community controls are included in all specifications. Child-related 
covariates include gender, month of birth, twin status and birth order. Mother's characteristics include education 
and age at first birth. Household characteristics include wealth index, access to water, access to electricity, access 
to latrine, whether the household reported having trouble getting to the hospital, ethnicity and whether the 
household is urban.  
 
 
